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Prominent scholars argue that torts is just for the loss of things you had
before you were wrongfully injured. According to this view, tort law
remedies the loss of a house you already live in, or health you already
enjoy, or child you already have—but not the loss of a bigger house or
better health or child you hope for, but do not have yet. John Gardner,
Greg Keating, Arthur Ripstein, and Seana Shiffrin all subscribe to some
version of this account. It reflects a familiar legal priority of existing
losses over future ones, and relies on psychology principles of loss
aversion and prospect theory to support the sense that it is worse to
have something taken away from you when that thing—your house or
health or child—was already yours, than it is to be deprived of that very
same thing if you did not quite have it yet.
* Professor of Law and Herzog Endowed Scholar, University of San Diego School of Law.
The editors at DePaul Law Review provided stellar feedback on this contribution to the Clifford
Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy. Conversation with colleagues and friends improved
these ideas immensely. I owe thanks to Glenn Cohen, Rebecca Eisenberg, Nora Engstrom,
Michael Green, Dan Hemel, Stephan Landsman, Mark Lemley, Myrisha Lewis, Jonathan Masur,
Lisa Ouellette, Stephanie Plamandon Bair, Robert Rabin, Richard Re, Lauren Scholz, Cathe-
rine Sharkey, Jacob Sherkow, Steve Smith, Christopher Yoo. For valuable engagement, I am
grateful to faculty and student participants at the Health Law Workshop at Harvard Law School,
the Clifford Symposium at DePaul College of Law, the PULSE Lecture Series at UCLA School
of Law, and the Junior Faculty Forum for Law and STEM at Stanford Law School.
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This backward-looking vision of tort law makes too much of the
asymmetry between “harms” and “benefits.” “Harms” worsen your
position in the here and now, as compared with how things were going
for you before you were wronged. “Benefits” instead look ahead to
how your position would have improved had it not been for the wrong
that was done to you. Tort liability should not be closed off to
unrealized benefits if you had good reason to expect that those plans
would have materialized otherwise. Future losses to your home or
health—even intangible losses of reproductive health—should still be
compensable. The hardest question is not about liability but remedies.
This Article spells out practical ways for courts to redress these
intangible future losses through principled measures of plaintiff well-
being.
“[T]o the memory of . . . our hopes and dream lost.”1
A TALE OF TWO CITIES
Hundreds of would-be parents had their dreams of biological chil-
dren crushed in 2018.2 High-capacity freezers that were storing their
embryos failed at two major medical facilities in Cleveland and San
1. Ariana Eunjung Cha, These Would-be Parents’ Embryos Were Lost. Now They’re




2. See Natalie Lampert, Their Embryos Were Destroyed: Now They Mourn the Children
They’ll Never Have, THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/
2018-/may/-13/their-embryos-were-destroyed-now-they-mourn-the-children-theyll-never-have.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 3 21-APR-20 12:00
2020] REDRESSING FUTURE INTANGIBLE LOSSES 421
Francisco.3 These subzero containers are not regulated any better than
kitchen appliances or farm tools. The bulk vats were developed in the
1960s to store livestock semen for breeding.4 Now they are used by
almost five hundred fertility clinics nationwide to cryopreserve peo-
ple’s eggs and embryos at a constant -196°C.5 Temperatures began ris-
ing on the same unstaffed weekend that March, with remote alarms
inactive. By the time lab technicians returned on Monday morning,
everything inside had been thawed beyond rescue or repair.6
Center operators pointed the finger at defective equipment, while
manufacturers blamed laboratory staff for “forget[ting] to refill” the
liquid nitrogen chambers in these “ever-dependable vessels.”7 These
were not the first fertility tank malfunctions. In October 2005, a
mechanical crash at the University of Florida Health Center thawed
the sperm that sixty men had cryopreserved before undergoing chem-
otherapy or deploying overseas.8 An April 2012 malfunction likewise
took the biological tissues of two hundred fifty patients and troops at
Northwestern Memorial Hospital who had put their samples on ice.9
And freezer breakdowns are hardly the only time that the very spe-
cialists entrusted to help people have biological children are the ones
who render their sex cells unusable or reproductive capacities inoper-
ative. The case law is rife with clinics that have lost, destroyed, and
3. See Danielle Zoellner, Second Fertility Clinic in the Last Week Has a Freezer Failure, DAILY
MAIL (Mar. 11, 2018, 6:05 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5488507/Eggs-embryos-
possibly-damaged-California-clinic.html.
4. See Kayla Webley Adler, When Your Dreams of Motherhood Are Destroyed, MARIE
CLAIRE (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.marieclaire.com/health-fitness/a23327231/egg-freezing-em
bryos-lack-of-regulation/.
5. See Amy Goldstein, Fertility Clinic Informs Hundreds of Patients Their Eggs May Have
Been Damaged, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/fertility-clinic-informs-hundreds-of-patients-their-eggs-may-be-damaged/2018/03/11/b605
ea82-2536-11e8-b79d-f3d931db7f68_story.html?utm_term=.1155a73dbbec.
6. See Rich Gardella & Erika Edwards, Heartbreak, anxiety, lawsuits: The egg-freezing disaster
a year later, NBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/all/heartbreak-anxiety-
lawsuits-egg-freezing-disaster-year-later-n978891.
7. Mitchel C. Schiewe et al., Comprehensive Assessment of Cryogenic Storage Risk and Qual-
ity Management Concerns: Best Practice Guidelines for ART Labs, 36 J. ASSISTED REPROD. &
GENETICS 5, 5 (2019); see also Zahava P. Michaelson et al., Early Detection of Cryostorage Tank
Failure Using a Weight-based Monitoring System, 36 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 655
(2019).
8. See Nathan Crabbe, Mechanical Glitch Ruins Sperm Stored at UF Center, GAINESVILLE SUN
(Sept. 3, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.gainesville.com/news/20060903/mechanical-glitch-ruins-
sperm-stored-at-uf-center.
9. See Doe v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., No. 2014L000869, at 2 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 2013); Michelle
Manchir, Lawsuit: Northwestern Memorial Damaged Sperm Samples, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-08-21-ct-met-40-northwestern-frozen-sperm-
lawsuits-20130821-story.html.
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contaminated frozen sperm,10 eggs,11 and embryos.12 Other facilities
have switched donors or put one patient’s samples into another.13
Physicians have also botched procedures that leave people unable to
conceive or gestate.14 And misadvised women about baseless dangers
that lead them to end the pregnancy they longed for.15 Doctors have
also misprescribed abortion pills to pregnant women who set out to
have a baby.16
A couple examples give a sense of the stakes. Cindy Baker and her
husband eagerly awaited the birth of their child. She was five months
pregnant when an abnormal pap smear indicated perils of proceeding
10. See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Robertson v. Saadat, No. BC621038 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26,
2016); Hollman v. Saadat, No. BC555411, at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2014); Kurchner v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 858 So. 2d 1220, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Baskette v. Atlanta Ctr.
for Reprod. Med., LLC, 648 S.E.2d 100, 102 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Doe v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., No.
2014L000869, at 2 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 20, 2013).
11. See, e.g., Kate Briquelet, Aspiring Mom: Fertility Clinic Destroyed My Embryos and My
Chance at Motherhood, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles-/
2016/03/30/fertility-clinic-destroyed-her-embryos.html; Jose Martinez, Lesbian Pair Sues for 3M
After Sperm Bank Loses Embryos, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.nydailyne-
ws.com/news/lesbian-pair-sues-3m-sperm-bank-loses-embryos-article-1.214041; SoCal Patch
(Patch Staff), Couple Accuses Pasadena Reproductive Center of Losing Embryos, PASADENA
PATCH (Aug. 11, 2016, 3:05 PM), http://patch.com/california/pasadena-ca/couple-accuses-
pasadena-reproductive-center-losing-embryos.
12. See, e.g., Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1261–62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005);
Kazmeirczak v. Reprod. Genetic Inst., Inc., No. 10 C 05253, 2012 WL 4482753, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 26, 2012); Miller v. Am. Infertility Grp. of Ill., 897 N.E.2d 837, 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008);
Frisina v. Women & Infants Hosp. of R.I., Nos. CIV. A. 95-4037, CIV. A. 95-4469, CIV. A. 95-
5827, 2002 WL 1288784, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002); Inst. for Women’s Health, P.L.L.C.
v. Imad, No. 04-05-00555-CV, 2006 WL 334013, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2006).
13. See Creed v. United Hosp., 600 N.Y.S.2d 151, 151–52 (App. Div. 1993); Lubowitz v. Al-
bert Einstein Med. Ctr., 623 A.2d 3, 4–5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Complaint at 4–5, Walterspiel v.
Jain, No. BC467123 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2011); Mike Celizic, Genetic Parents of Embryo Felt
“Powerless,” TODAY (Sept. 23, 2009, 6:00 AM), https://www.today.com/health/genetic-parents-
embryo-felt-powerless-1C9404873; Associated Press, Woman Awarded $1 Million in Embryo
Mix-Up, NBC NEWS: WOMEN’S HEALTH (Aug. 4, 2004, 3:08 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com-/id/
5603277/ns/health-womens_health/t/woman-awarded-million-embryo-mix-up/#.V9sl2JM-rJE4.
14. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cabrini Med. Ctr., 730 N.E.2d 949, 950 (N.Y. 2000); Albala v. City of
New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 788–89 (N.Y. 1981); Chen v. Genetics & IVF Inst., Inc., No. L-
153343, 1996 WL 1065627, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 1996); Terrie Morgan-Besecker, Judge
Refuses to Seal $4.25 Million Settlement in Baby Death Case, TIMES-TRIB. (Aug. 23, 2016), http://
thetimes-tribune.com/news/judge-refuses-to-seal-4-25-million-settlement-in-baby-death-case-
1.2081805.
15. See, e.g., Elderkin v. Greater New Haven OB-GYN Grp., P.C., No. NNHCV156056190,
LEXIS 1440, Conn., at *1–4 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2018); Johnson v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 1, 2
(D.D.C. 1990); Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538, 539 (N.Y.
1987); Breyne v. Potter, 574 S.E.2d 916, 919 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Alger v. Univ. of Rochester
Med. Ctr., 980 N.Y.S.2d 200, 200–01 (App. Div. 2014).
16. See Matt Fountain, Atascadero Woman Says Doctor Mistakenly Gave Her an Abortion
Pill—Ending Her Pregnancy, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 8, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://www.sacbee.
com/news/state/california/article224083755.html.
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into the last trimester. Her doctor ordered a biopsy to test for malig-
nant cells in her cervix.17 When the test came back from the lab, the
doctor called Cindy to break the news: “Your pap smear came back
Stage III. It’s on the verge of becoming invasive cancer.”18 He told her
that the only way to treat it was to terminate the pregnancy “as quick
as possible.”19 The doctor made the appointment for Cindy that week.
Only after having the abortion did she learn that she was healthy. Her
tests had never indicated a greater threat of cancer.20 Cindy’s doctor
simply misread the results. She could have kept her pregnancy and
had the child she and her husband so desperately wanted without any
special risk to her own life or the baby’s. She was haunted day and
night with “panic attacks” and “feelings of suffocation” at the horror
that she had “had an abortion for no reason at all.”21
Sarah Robertson married her high school sweetheart, Aaron. The
couple decided they would start a family after completing their de-
grees and buying a house. They were well on their way when a stroke
landed Aaron in a coma that took his life at twenty-nine. Before he
died, Aaron had his sperm extracted to cryopreserve his reproductive
material, while Sarah went back to school and saved up for the
home.22 She set her heart on carrying out the plan they had made
together. But when she was ready to have their child, the clinic in-
formed her that the vials were gone. They were her only chance to
have a baby who would share her husband’s genetics. Sarah’s lawyer
figured the facility never told her because it “believed she would
never come back to use that sperm,” that she’d probably “find some-
one else in her life to move on . . . and start a family with[.]”23 For
Robertson’s part, “[i]t’s been heartbreaking . . . to lose your husband
then have something like this happen. I still feel like I’m in a
nightmare.”24
When professional transgressions keep people from being able to
reproduce like they had sought or hoped to, these lost opportunities
17. Baker v. Gordon, 759 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
18. Id. at 89.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 90.
21. Id. at 89–90, 94. For discussion of similar cases, see Ronen Perry & Yehuda Adar, Wrong-
ful Abortion: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 507,
512–14 (2005); Brandy Zadrozny, Parents Sue Doctors over “Wrongful Abortion,” DAILY BEAST
(Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/29/parents-sue-over-wrongful-
abortion.html.
22. Complaint, Robertson v. Saadat (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 2016) (No. BC621038).
23. Cole Kazdin, What Happened to Aaron Robertson’s Sperm?, MEL MAG. (Dec. 12, 2016),
https://melmagazine.com/what-happened-to-aaron-robertsons-sperm-7473ec028c47.
24. Id.
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deserve a remedy. This Article critically appraises the distinctive chal-
lenges that future intangible losses like these present. And it seeks to
work out a principled approach to damage awards that will not penal-
ize specialists unfairly or restrict access to valuable reproductive ser-
vices. The project begins by showing how existing regulations fail to
vindicate procreation interests against negligent misconduct or un-
compensated injury. Then it sets forth the limited reach of available
suits ranging from contract enforcement, property protection, and
wrongful death to medical malpractice, breach of informed consent,
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. A specialist’s thwarting
of wanted pregnancy and parenthood falls through the cracks of ex-
isting regimes: None say that missed opportunities for biological chil-
dren matter, not legally speaking. The Tennessee Supreme Court
summed up this state of affairs in a 2015 case, explaining that the “law
does not recognize disruption of family planning either as an indepen-
dent cause of action or element of damages.”25 After mining the his-
tory of personality torts for common law analogs in products liability
and privacy rights, I answer the central criticism that future intangible
harms are too speculative and unworthy of remedy. I argue that de-
prived parenthood is real and serious enough a harm to warrant civil
justice recourse. Finally, I apply the doctrines of loss-of-chance and
harm-mitigation to account for complicating factors like preexisting
infertility and the availability of adoption.
THE NOT-QUITE WILD WEST
No governmental agency or authority keeps close watch over as-
sisted reproduction in the United States.26 At the federal level, the
only directive that comes close is the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act of 1992.27 But the fertility industry convinced Con-
gress to add a carve-out forbidding the agency from “establish[ing]
any standard, regulation, or requirement, which has the effect of exer-
cising supervision or control over the practice of medicine in assisted
reproductive technology programs.”28 So the Food and Drug Admin-
25. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 238–39, 271–72 (Tenn.
2015).
26. Ellie Kincaid, A Booming Medical Industry in the US Is Almost Totally Unregulated, BUS.
INSIDER (July 7, 2015, 3:50 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/assisted-reproduction-ivf-in-
dustry-regulation-2015-6.
27. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, H.R. 4773, 102nd Cong., 138
CONG. REC. 16685 (June 29, 1992) (enacted).
28. Id. at 16686. “In particular, I would like to single out the excellent work of the American
Fertility Society, both in terms of their voluntary guidelines and the cooperation they have
shown the majority and the minority of our committee in working on this legislation.” Id. at
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istration (FDA) has no say over which procreation procedures are
used or how they are carried out.29 At the state level, laws are mostly
limited to embryonic stem cell research, insurance coverage for infer-
tility treatment, and surrogacy rules that govern gestational agree-
ments and carrier compensation.30
When it comes to reproductive negligence, there’s no licensure re-
quirement, no monitoring regime, no data registry for adverse events,
no system of warnings, disclosures, or disclaimers, or any other mea-
sures to track assisted procreation facilities or to hold the specialists
they employ accountable.31 Professional barriers to entry make as-
sisted reproduction less of a cowboy venture than a fragmented cartel
of mostly mom-and-pop shops.32 Private organizations like the Col-
16688. See also 138 CONG. REC. 8211 (Apr. 3, 1992) (statement of Hon. Ron Wyden) (“[S]everal
members and staff from professional societies and consumer groups worked hard with me to
perfect this legislation over the past several weeks, particularly Lynne Lawrence and Dr. Robert
Visscher, M.D., of the American Fertility Society.”); Fertility Clinic Services: Hearing on H.R.
3940 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
102nd Cong. 98–102 (1992) (statement of Robert D. Visscher, Executive Director, American
Fertility Society) (“[T]he clinical practice of reproductive medicine . . . depends a lot on the
individual characteristics of the patient you are treating. It also depends on the resources that
are available, not the least of which are the financial resources that are available or the institu-
tional resources that are available . . . we don’t feel that there could be regulation to the degree
that there can be in the laboratory. The laboratory, you can set standards. But for the practice of
medicine it’s a matter of doing it in a different way.”).
29. In 2018, the FDA rejected as beyond its scope a petition to make it harder for sperm
donors to sire dozens of genetic siblings who don’t know they’re related. The agency has so far
weighed in only to discourage research on next-generation advances like mitochondrial transfer,
human cloning, and germline embryo editing. See Myrisha S. Lewis, How Subterranean Regula-
tion Hinders Innovation in Assisted Reproductive Technology, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1239, 1269
(2018).
30. Just a handful of states wade any further into assisted reproduction. In 2018, Arizona
passed a law that says, when estranged couples disagree about what do with the frozen embryos
they created, the partner who wants to use them to reproduce wins out, even if they’d previously
agreed to have them destroyed. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-318.03 (LexisNexis 2018). A 2015
Utah law gives donor-conceived children who are eighteen and older access to the medical histo-
ries of their biological parents—even if those donors had only agreed to provide reproductive
material under conditions of anonymity. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-708 (West 2015). In
2019, Indiana and Texas passed laws against a doctor’s failure to obtain his fertility patient’s
consent before inseminating her using his own sperm. See S.B. 174, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2019); Relating to the prosecution of the offense of sexual assault. S.B. 1259, 86th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019). And Louisiana has since 1986 required fertility doctors to
“possess specialized training and skill,” without elaboration on what kind of knowledge or ad-
vances that entails. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:128 (LexisNexis 2009).
31. See Michael Ollove, Lightly Regulated In Vitro Fertilization Yields Thousands of Babies
Annually, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science
/lightly-regulated-in-vitro-fertilization-yields-thousands-of-babies-annually/2015/04/13/f1f3fa36-
d8a2-11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html?utm_term=.366a1ca3f9c5.
32. For example, the reproductive endocrinologists who perform IVF have to complete a
three-year specialized fellowship following a four-year OB/GYN residency and another four of
medical school.
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lege of American Pathologists and the American Society for Repro-
ductive Medicine (ASRM) set forth industry standards and best
practices for facilities that opt into their Laboratory Accreditation
Program.33 But these recommendations are completely voluntary and
routinely ignored. ASRM lacks the authority to sanction members
that violate its guidelines, or auditing power required to detect such
violations.34
Four factors help to explain this virtual regulatory vacuum on the
practice of reproductive medicine and technology. First, many people
are wary of ceding any foothold of control to the state on matters of
procreation. Today, any American who can afford in vitro fertilization
(IVF), surrogacy, and sperm or egg donation is free to use it. Negli-
gence protections could open the door to further restrictions on who
gets to form families and how.35 Second is the free-market origins of
reproductive technology in the United States, where it developed as
more of a commercial industry than medical field, subject to the usual
government investment and surveillance.36 A robust private sphere of
for-profit clinics sustains lobbying forces that have successfully
blocked efforts to rein in its operations.37
A third factor is the murky politics of regulating assisted reproduc-
tion. Conservative states of course legislate abortion and contracep-
33. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med. et al., Revised Minimum Standards for Practices Offering




34. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Embryo Storage Bill Seeks Oversight of Fertility Centers and




35. These limits on reproductive access are not relics of a bygone era or repressive third
world. Some developed countries like France still forbid single people and same-sex couples
from using any tools of assisted procreation, including IVF and sperm donation. See Angelique
Chrisafis, France debates law to let lesbians and single women have IVF: Politicians brace for
protests over plan to end discrimination over fertility treatments, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/24/france-debates-law-lesbians-single-women-ivf.
36. In the early 1990s, the fertility industry convinced Congress to add a carve-out forbidding
the agency from “establish[ing] any standard, regulation, or requirement, which has the effect of
exercising supervision or control over the practice of medicine in assisted reproductive technol-
ogy programs.” Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, H.R. 4773, 102nd
Cong.,138 CONG. REC. 16685 (June 29, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. 8210–11 (Apr. 3, 1992) (statement
of Hon. Ron Wyden); Fertility Clinic Services: Hearing on H.R. 3940 Before the Subcomm. on
Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 102nd Cong. 98–102 (1992) (state-
ment of Robert D. Visscher, Executive Director, American Fertility Society).
37. See RESOLVE: THE NATIONAL INFERTILITY ASSOCIATION, Convio Case Study (2009),
http://www.convio.com/files/RESOLVE.pdf.
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tion all the time in the name of family values and unborn life.38 But
the workings of IVF and sperm donation raise hard new questions
whose answers can pose uncertain electoral stakes even in reliably red
or blue districts, and drive a wedge between core voting blocks that
usually see eye to eye.39 Fourth is the limited public outcry against
transgressions in this domain. The civil justice transformations of
America’s past have required a political climate ripe for reform.40 But
there is no groundswell of civic agitation to replace even medical mal-
practice with a no-fault system like the one New Zealand and the Nor-
dic countries administer for personal injuries by doctors and hospitals,
or drugs and devices.41 High barriers to ex ante legislation leaves vic-
38. Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: State Policy Trends
at Midyear, 2017, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 13, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2017/
07/laws-affecting-reproductive-health-and-rights-state-policy-trends-midyear-2017.
39. To overgeneralize: Christian coalitions often urge citizens to be fruitful and multiply—
especially straight, married couples. But while Evangelicals may support negligence protections,
many Catholics are disinclined to regulate the interference with “natural” reproduction in ways
that implicitly sanction that practice they frown on. Prudent officials avoid wading into the polit-
ics of procreation gone awry for fear of fracturing their bases.
40. The paradigm is workers’ compensation—an insurance program that enables people who
get hurt on the job to recoup for medical expenses and lost wages without having to prove
misconduct was to blame. Employee benefits that are now standard in every state did not even
exist until the twentieth century. Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of
Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J. LAW & ECON. 305, 327 (1998).
Before that, there was only accident litigation, whose steep cost and deep uncertainty left most
injured workers unable to secure damage awards against dangerous factory conditions and ram-
pant child labor. Worker’s compensation came to replace these deficient protections only be-
cause labor groups and other Progressive Era crusaders across the country demanded safer and
healthier workplaces. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORK-
INGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 31–40 (2004). The next
tort overhaul came in the late 1970s, when half of states enacted a no-fault system of recovery
for harms arising from motor-vehicle accidents. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, When Cars Crash:
The Automobile’s Tort Legacy, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 293, 312–13 (2018). These auto re-
forms were again embedded within larger movements, this time for car safety spearheaded by
Ralph Nader’s muckraking bestseller, Unsafe at Any Speed. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY
SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965).
41. See KEN OLIPHANT & RICHARD W. WRIGHT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND COMPENSA-
TION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 555–57 (2013); Robert L. Rabin, The Politics of Tort Reform, 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 709, 710–11 (1992). There is one exception. Two states have experimented with
no-fault compensation for birthing-related harms since the late1980s. Liability insurance premi-
ums had skyrocketed for obstetrician-gynecologists after a wave of high-cost litigation involving
newborn neurological injuries. Virginia and Florida transferred claims from civil courts to ad-
ministrative schemes financed through assessments on mostly participating physicians and hospi-
tals. These schemes replaced hard-to-prove negligence claims with guaranteed reimbursement
for health care and lost earnings any time a child is born with serious spinal cord or brain injuries
from being deprived of oxygen during labor or delivery. Insufficient funding and dwindling sub-
sidies have jeopardized the Virginia and Florida regimes since their inception, however. The
hundreds of millions of dollars they have paid out are meager relative to those available through
conventional litigation. And injured parties have further destabilized these insurance alterna-
tives by sidestepping them to pursue fault-based actions with the promise of larger awards. No
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tims of IVF misconduct to pursue their own after-the-fact justice from
the courts for wrongs done and harms incurred.
THE LIMITS OF PRIVATE LAW
You would think that judicial recourse would be easy to come by.
Surely these errors breach contracts—at least implied ones—to keep
people’s reproductive materials safe. But no—since before the first
IVF lawsuit in 1995, clinics have routinely required patients to sign
indemnification clauses that shield them from liability against loss for
any reason, even negligence.42 Aggregate settlements might work for
mass losses of frozen specimens—except that courts have seen these
harms as too various to certify as a class.43 Since freezing their sam-
ples, some plaintiffs have grown too old to reproduce, while others
have gotten divorced or adopted. These injuries are thought to lack
the sufficient commonality required to certify a class.
There is also a deeper problem. Our legal system is reluctant to
recognize reproductive harms from which a plaintiff’s body and bank
account emerge unscathed. Victims of freezer failures do not incur any
property damage, since eggs and embryos are generally not consid-
ered property.44 Nor do these losses incur any physical intrusion, aside
from whatever medical procedure the parties freely agreed to. Such
harms find little solicitude under American law.
A couple identified as Jane and John Doe managed to create three
embryos after several attempts at IVF.45 To store the embryos, their
clinic used a solution that had been infected with a “fatal neurological
disorder” that was “the human equivalent of . . . ‘Mad Cow Dis-
ease.’”46 The manufacturer had previously sent the clinic a “Product
Withdrawal Notice” advising customers to “immediately discontinue
its use.”47 But the clinic used the solution anyway, exposing all of the
reproductive materials it touched, including the Does’ embryos. Yet
the couple’s claims were summarily dismissed: The loss of their em-
other state has followed Virginia’s and Florida’s lead to resolve either birth-related claims or any
other medical injuries in agency offices instead of trial courts. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5014
(2007); FLA. STAT. § 766.302 (2007). For discussion, see Gil Siegal et al., Adjudicating Severe
Birth Injury Claims in Florida and Virginia: The Experience of a Landmark Experiment in Per-
sonal Injury Compensation, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 493, 533 (2008); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Exit,
Adversarialism, and the Stubborn Persistence of Tort, 6 J. TORT LAW 1, 35–36 (2015).
42. Editorial, Fertility Clinic Is Sued over the Loss of Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at
A26.
43. Hebert v. Ochsner Fertility Clinic, 102 So. 3d 913, 921 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
44. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
45. Doe v. Irvine Sci. Sales Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 739 (E.D. Va. 1998).
46. Id.
47. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 11 21-APR-20 12:00
2020] REDRESSING FUTURE INTANGIBLE LOSSES 429
bryos resulted in “neither personal nor property injuries” that would
entitle them to relief.48 The invasive IVF procedure was “an elective
process” that the Does “chose to undergo” prior to the contamina-
tion.49 The Does had no valid negligence action because they could
“prove no actionable physical harm or property damage resulting
from Defendants’ actions.”50
The non-recognition reproductive suffering stymies recovery for de-
prived procreation even in more egregious circumstances. Glenda
Ann Robinson’s doctor tied her fallopian tubes without her knowl-
edge while she was under anesthesia for a cesarean section.51 A 2001
Maryland court would not entertain her claims for intentional battery
or informed consent, and not just because there was a chance that the
mistake could have been chalked up to a simple administrative mix-
up. Even if negligence were to blame, the unwitting sterilization “was
not harmful because it did not cause any additional physical pain, in-
jury or illness other than that occasioned by the C-Section procedure”
that she had already agreed to.52 The court also suggested that
Glenda, an African American mother of six, did not need any more
kids.53 The court dismissed that “she and her husband were planning
on having a seventh child . . .” and emphasized that three children
were “born out-of-wedlock . . . .”54 The court concluded that denying
Glenda the “ability to have a seventh child after previously giving
birth to six children is hardly something which would offend a reason-
able sense of personal dignity.”55
These courts miss the centrality of wanted procreation and the mag-
nitude of its deprivation. It can be hard to define the sense of empti-
ness and alienation victims face. Professors Dan Solove and Danielle
Citron capture something like this loss in a metaphor they use to de-
48. Id. at 743.
49. Id. at 741.
50. Id. at 739, 741, 743; Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, Doe v. Irvine Sci. Sales Co., 7 F. Supp.
2d 737 (E.D. Va. 1998). Another court gave Cora Creed and her husband the same reason for
rejecting their complaint against the clinic that negligently transferred their embryos into some-
body else. IVF had required hormone drugs—some ingested, others injected—as well as surgery.
But that “intrusion into the plaintiff wife’s body to extract her ova was not a cause of the subse-
quent improper implanting” of their embryos “into the other woman.” The court stated that the
error itself did not physically harm her. Creed v. United Hosp., 600 N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (App. Div.
1993).
51. Robinson v. Cutchin, 140 F. Supp. 2d 488, 490 (D. Md. 2001).
52. Id. at 493.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 491.
55. Id. at 493, 491 n.1.
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scribe a distinct injury: personal data breach.56 Having your sensitive
or identifying information leaked and vulnerable to malicious use may
not encroach on you in physical or economic ways. But it still intrudes
on your life—like an unseen obstacle in the middle of a crowded
room:
We may not be able to see an invisible object, but we see how every-
one is bumping into it, how they are changing where they stand be-
cause of it, how they are walking different routes to avoid it, and so
on. The object is invisible to the naked eye, but it is having a signifi-
cant effect.57
Like the data breach victims who invest time and energy to protect
against identity theft, patients deprived of procreation go to great
lengths to try to have a child. They exhaust savings. They endure pry-
ing queries, onerous appointments, and risky medical procedures.
They make professional and personal plans around the offspring they
anticipate having—they pick names, prepare nurseries, and scout
preschools. These efforts testify to the significance and sincerity of this
reproductive interest—one that tort law should protect against its
wrongful frustration.
Tort law might not ultimately be the most effective way to deter
reproductive negligence or compensate its victims. Damage awards
will likely be passed along to prospective patients in form of higher
prices that reduce access to care if would-be procreators cannot afford
it. But at least tort liability would spread these costs more widely
rather than concentrating them all on victims alone. That is not to say
that after-the-fact remedies are superior to regulatory oversight. Com-
pared to courts, legislatures and agencies have greater democratic le-
gitimacy to implement measures designed to keep misconduct from
happening in the first place. These governing bodies are equipped to
find facts about the relative merits of incremental precautions in the
course of investigations, hearings, or public commentary that are not
limited to any single case or to events that have already happened.
But the peculiar divisiveness and political economy of reproductive
politics in the United States gives regulation an outside chance.58
Meanwhile, tort plaintiffs are fueled by the self-interest to get justice
as quickly as possible, and verdicts can alert lawmakers to the need for
change, while ad hoc juries are immune to lobbying or capture.
56. See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737 (2018).
57. Id. at 756.
58. See supra notes 26–44 and accompanying text.
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OF PERSONALITY TORTS AND BEYOND
For most of American history, courthouses were not the place to
work out intangible harms to emotional tranquility or reputation.
Before the twentieth century, judicial remedies were limited to physi-
cal injury or property damage. The only exceptions were torts for as-
sault (threatened touching), offensive battery (like spitting), false
imprisonment (restraint without consent or justification).59 These
were explicitly grounded in wrongful touching or detention, where
bodily interferences were imminent or already manifested. All other
losses were consigned to the rough and tumble of quotidian social af-
fairs—people just took those less tangible harms on the chin, unless
they responded through verbal retaliation or physical dueling.60 Infor-
mal mechanisms might have worked in small towns, where people
knew each other and shared core values—but not in the big cities
where rural workers flocked en masse in search of commercial jobs.
Urban dislocation between 1880 and 1910 obscured the forces respon-
sible for wounding one’s sense of self or worth, making it difficult, if
not impossible, to defend one’s honor “with the sword.”61
Courts held greater promise for resolving these disputes as they be-
gan grappling with the injuries born of modern work and social life.
Technological advances from Edison’s light bulb to Ford’s assembly
line produced flash burns and broken bones on a larger scale than
ever before. The Supreme Court observed that “[t]he industrial
revolution multiplied the number of workmen exposed to injury from
increasingly powerful and complex mechanisms,” while “[t]raffic of
velocities, volumes and varieties unheard of” suddenly “subject[ed]
the wayfarer to intolerable casualty risks.”62 Consumer goods from
soft drinks to power tools let dangerous defects loose on unsuspecting
patrons. Meanwhile, new drugs and industrial chemicals contributed
to gradual maladies with indeterminate consequences. Lawmakers
could not be expected to foresee every harm these innovations might
generate. And the slow churn of the legislative process took too long
to erect effective guardrails before those injuries happened. But, after-
59. See Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for
Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 363–67 (2006).
60. See William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L.
REV. 874, 875–77 (1939).
61. E. L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen:IV.—To His Own Reputation, SCRIBNER’S MAGA-
ZINE, July 1890, at 59. For discussion, see Samantha Barbas, The Social Origins of Personality
Torts, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 393, 400–02 (2015).
62. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 253–54 (1952).
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the-fact victims could still find relief in court, even if the parties that
injured them had not broken any promises.63
In 1910, Donald MacPherson landed in the hospital when the wood-
spoked wheels fell off his Model 10 Runabout while he was driving it
in upstate New York.64 The hitch corkscrewed his car off the road,
where it ricocheted off a telephone pole and tumbled end over end
into a three-foot ditch. MacPherson sued the manufacturer for his
broken wrist, cracked ribs, and battered face. Buick executives con-
tended that the motor company had not made MacPherson any
promises. He had not bought the automobile from them, after all, but
from a go-between retailer that made no specific representations
about the car’s quality.65 Judge Benjamin Cardozo rejected Buick’s
argument that liability claims could not extend past the sales vendor.
He was adamant that the brave new world of remote transactions de-
manded more of the law than the cramped enforcement of face-to-
face agreements. That merchants did not do business directly with
consumers could not justify immunity from liability for whatever inju-
ries their products unleashed. Basic principles of fair dealing and rea-
sonable care required that courts let injured parties sue companies
they never shook hands with. Judge Cardozo concluded:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and
limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows
out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obli-
gation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.66
“The law” in which Judge Cardozo placed this legal duty is tort law,
which he celebrated for its doctrinal agility and moral imagination.67
Negligence liability enables injured parties to obtain recourse from
the faraway firms that create the products that harmed them. This tort
doctrine is not limited to physical injuries like MacPherson’s, which
can be traced to faulty parts from distant factories. It also protects
against the dignitary harms that mudslingers and peeping Toms  inflict
to self-image and reputation. This is where “personality torts” come
in—libel, slander, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.68
63. See William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960).
64. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 384–85 (1916).
65. Id. at 388.
66. Id. at 390.
67. See David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 967–69
(2007); Robert L. Rabin, Restating the Law: The Dilemmas of Products Liability, 30 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 197, 199–200 (1997).
68. See Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967). Richard Abel observes that
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The most famous such tort is the right to privacy. Former wrestler
Hulk Hogan famously asserted this right in 2016 to win a $140 million
judgment that bankrupted Gawker after the media giant posted his
sex tapes online.69 As established as the privacy right is today, Ameri-
can law shut its eyes to such unconsented exposure of secrets until the
late 1800s, when advances in picture-taking made natural bedfellows
with professional muckraking. News outlets used to be an exclusive
enterprise, with the handful of major papers focused on economics,
politics, and art.70 Photography at that time was an unwieldy and time-
consuming undertaking in which willing participants had their por-
traits taken in a formal studio.71 Cheaper and quicker printing tech-
niques ushered in a competitive tabloid industry that used salacious
reporting to sell papers.72 Sensationalist journalism got a major boost
from the invention of handheld cameras that let amateur shutterbugs
pry into the personal spaces of other people and memorialize their
guarded moments for the whole world to see.73
These privacy incursions found no redress in the law of contract,
defamation, copyright, or otherwise. In 1888, Thomas Cooley, former
Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court, proposed that the legal
system take action. The second edition of his famed treatise on torts
sets forth a novel right “to be let alone.”74 Two years later, law school
classmates Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis filled in the details of
that right in the pathbreaking article they published in the Harvard
Law Review.75 Warren and Brandeis argued that individuals should be
entitled to control the extent to which their depictions, “sentiments,
and emotions shall be communicated to others.”76 Fearing that “what
“history shapes tort law” not only through the “effect of technology on the ability of inadvertent
actions to inflict catastrophic harm, but also . . . the growing capacity of medicine to repair the
harm (at ever increasing prices), and the corollary sense of entitlement to physical and mental
well-being.” Richard Abel, General Damages are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable,
and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 255 (2006).
69. Sydney Ember, In Bankruptcy, Gawker Offers Itself for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2016, at
A1.
70. See ROBERT WILLIAM JONES, JOURNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 248 (1947).
71. See SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA
9–25 (2018).
72. See MICHAEL LYNCH, THE INTERNET OF US 89 (2016).
73. See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A
PUBLIC WORLD 12–27 (2018).
74. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). The expression previously
appeared in the copyright case Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 634 (1834) (“The defendant asks
nothing—wants nothing, but to be let alone until it can be shown that he has violated the rights
of another.”).
75. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). Brandeis, like Cardozo, would ascend to a seat on the United States Supreme Court.
76. Id. at 198.
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is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops,”
they proposed a civil action to sue for the public disclosure of private
facts.
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency . . . . To satisfy a prurient taste[,] the de-
tails of sexual relations are [ ] broadcast in . . . the daily papers. To
occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip,
which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.77
Highbrow dailies piled on this indignation against voyeuristic snap-
shots in news and advertising. The Los Angeles Times decried the
state of affairs in which ordinary individuals, who “in no way put
themselves before the public,” found themselves “dragged into notori-
ety by any adventurer who thinks he can fill his pockets by exploiting
them.” The New York Times took these mercenary “kodakers” to task
for “outrages” that led even the most “thick-skinned” celebrities—
hardly “shrinking violet[s]”—to “revolt from the continuous ordeal of
the camera.”78
Judges initially rejected appeals to Warren and Brandeis’s privacy
action for straying too far from existing precedents in the common
law. The very “phrase ‘right of privacy,’” they complained, originated
with that “clever article in the Harvard Law Review.”79 In 1902, New
York’s high court protested that even the “[m]ention of such a right is
not to be found in Blackstone, Kent or any other of the great com-
mentators upon the law.”80 However, just three years later, Georgia
became the first state to recognize the privacy right when its supreme
court ordered an insurer to pay the man whose image the company
had used in its advertisements without his consent.81 “One who
desires to live a life of partial seclusion,” the court affirmed, “has a
right to choose the times, places, and manner in which and at which he
will submit himself to the public gaze.”82 By 1941, most states recog-
nized the now-familiar tort of privacy.83 Just as click-camera incur-
sions placed privacy interests in sharp relief, botched IVF procedures
and lost embryos bring to fuller expression the meaning and signifi-
cance of interests related to having children.84
77. Id. at 196–98.
78. The Right of Privacy: Georgia’s Highest Court Makes Ruling Adverse to that of Judge
Parker, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1905, at 4; The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902, at 8.
79. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 444 (N.Y. 1902).
80. Id.
81. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905).
82. Id.
83. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1050 (1st ed. 1941).
84. To be clear, my claim is not that tort law is the most effective or efficient way to deter
these transgressions or compensate its victims. It probably is not. Exorbitant damages could
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HARMS AND (UNREALIZED) BENEFITS
The tort system is equipped to accommodate reproductive injuries
that do not involve any unwanted touching, broken agreement, or
damaged belongings—or so I suggested in a 2017 article in the Colum-
bia Law Review.85 Some scholars resisted the analogy to privacy’s ori-
gin story. The most formidable critique came from a distinguished
torts theorist, Professor Gregory Keating. His commentary in Colum-
bia’s online pages later that year began: “The invocation of this glori-
ous past tugs at the heartstrings of any torts scholar. But it moves my
mind less than my heart.”86 Professor Keating argued that “the com-
mon law of torts is poorly positioned to respond to this particular kind
of wrongful harm” because the ways in which “reproductive negli-
gence interferes with its victims’ pursuit of their [life] projects differs
from the interferences with which tort law is characteristically con-
cerned.”87 The tort system “protects people’s lives and possessions as
they are,” he explains, rather than “as they might be.”88 This domain
of law presumes that existing value “makes a greater claim on us than
value that has yet to be created.”89
reduce access to reproductive care by driving up prices beyond what would-be parents can af-
ford. These pass-through costs were the very reason that, in 1977, the California Supreme Court
denied awarding nine children the $100,000 that each requested for their mother’s lost “tute-
lage” and “affection” after she was seriously injured by a lighting fixture that fell on her from an
airport ceiling. Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 861 (Cal. 1977). The nearly million-
dollar payout would ostensibly rest with “the ‘negligent’ defendant or his insurer.” Id. at 862.
But the court reasoned that it would ultimately “be borne by the public generally in increased
insurance premiums or in the enhanced danger that accrues from the greater number of people
who may choose to go without insurance.” Id. Access concerns would be lower in states like
Massachusetts, which mandate insurance for certain techniques of assisted procreation. How-
ever, even there, aspiring parents want for coverage. But liability risks could chill the delivery of
higher-risk procedures that are some patient’s only hope to treat their infertility. That would not
be as big a problem if clinicians and facilities could pool their resources to protect against steep
payouts. That is how it works in most fields of medicine, where hospitals and doctors carry deep
coverage for adverse outcomes. But carriers are wary of liability exposure to the prohibitive
costs and moral hazard that typify reproductive care. Insurers call it a “triple risk activity” be-
cause it can harm not just the patient, but her partner and offspring too; any of whom might be
able to “pursu[e] a lawsuit against the physician, nurse, and/or hospital for bad outcomes.” See
Serena Scurria et al., Professional Liability Insurance in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, BMC Res.
Notes, June 17, 2011, at 1, 2. Tort liability would at least avoid concentrating their burden on the
luckless plaintiffs who are deprived of their ability to procreate.
85. Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2017).
86. Gregory C. Keating, Response to Fox: Impaired Conditions, Frustrated Expectations, and
the Law of Torts, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 212, 214 (2017), http://columbialawreview.org/
content/response-to-fox-impaired-conditions-frustrated-expectations-and-the-law-of-torts/.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 224.
89. Id.
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According to Professor Keating, torts remedy the wrongful depriva-
tion of health, wealth, or other goods that plaintiffs have already come
to enjoy—not the mere absence of goods they wish they had. Profes-
sor John Gardner makes a similar point in his 2018 book, From Per-
sonal Life to Private Law, when he writes that tort law redresses
harms to “the life one already has before one, with its current trajec-
tory.”90 Gardner makes clear that torts are just for damage to “the
house that the potential plaintiff already lives in,” or the “work she
already does,” or the “peace and quiet she has already found.”91 This
body of law does not guard against injuries to the bigger house or
better work or sounder peace that she dreams of.92 Tort protections
are limited to preserving what the plaintiff had at the time she got
injured—torts do not protect anything else that she might have gotten
after that point.
This priority of existing losses over potential ones reflects the
widely held view that behavioral economists call the endowment ef-
fect.93 This is the sense that it is worse to have something taken away
that was already yours, than it is to be denied that very same thing
that you do not yet have. Cognitive psychology principles like “loss
aversion” and “prospect theory” try to explain why people care more
about losing what is theirs at the moment, than they do missing out on
equivalent gains just around the corner.94 We usually think of harms
and benefits in these temporal terms that measure a person’s present
state of affairs against her past (harm) or future (benefit). Harms
worsen a person’s position in the here and now, as compared with the
position that she found herself in before that event or circumstance.
Benefits, by contrast, upgrade her current position by looking ahead
to how she can reasonably expect it to improve. It is like the differ-
ence between being infected with a disease and being denied the vac-
cine during an outbreak. The infection harms you presently, by
impairing your existing medical condition relative to what it was pre-
viously. Not receiving a vaccine leaves you at risk of the illness moving
forward. That loss does not cause you harm, in Keating’s terms—it
withholds a benefit.95 So too, he argues, when professionals upend
plans for procreation mishaps.
90. JOHN GARDNER, FROM PERSONAL LIFE TO PRIVATE LAW 179 (2018).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 179–80.
93. Id.
94. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 195–97 (1991).
95. See Keating, supra note 86, at 213.
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When professional misconduct takes away your chances of repro-
duction, what you miss out on is the future experience and genetic
relationship that characteristically brings people great meaning or sat-
isfaction. Yet that unrealized benefit is not as bad as a harm to the
same good you would have enjoyed before, Keating says.96 These
transgressions do not inflict the more serious kind of setback that he
refers to as harms—they simply deny benefits. It’s this fundamental
asymmetry, he argues, that makes tort law “inhospitable to the recog-
nition of [those] reproductive wrongs.”97 Prenatal losses do not harm
fertility patients, in the sense of worsening their post-negligence fam-
ily life, as compared with what it was before. Dropped embryos and
negligently caused miscarriages frustrate the parental future that
plaintiffs hoped for, but not any present or past existence they had
already laid claim to. And the tort system responds only to harms, on
Keating’s account—it was never intended to remedy the unfulfilled
benefits that people had just began to set their sights on. That is why
he says tort law cannot vindicate reproductive interests in pursuing
pregnancy and genetic parenthood. But even Keating himself ac-
knowledges elsewhere that tort awards are not really designed to re-
store plaintiffs to a point in time before the injury took place.98 Their
goal is to restore the narrative arc of victim’s lives.
Professor Keating makes too much of this harm/benefit asymmetry
and its ostensible connection to autonomy. Tort remedies should not
be foreclosed to people whose reproductive losses have not yet mate-
rialized, at least not when they had sound reason to expect that they
would reproduce and had planned their lives accordingly. Tort law is
capacious enough to remedy unfulfilled benefits—indeed, sometimes
it does. Courts allow medical malpractice grievances for future risk
and disrupted expectations.99 Damage awards are available for the
lost chance to achieve some more favorable outcomes like the lost
“opportunity to obtain a better degree of recovery.”100 In one case, an
obstetrician’s bungled surgery left a woman with fine health for now,
but higher odds of bowel obstruction down the road.101 The court ap-
96. Id. at 214–15.
97. Id. at 215.
98. See Gregory C. Keating, Comment on Avraham and Yuracko: Torts and the Paradox of
Conservative Justice, OHIO STATE L. J. ONLINE (2016).
99. Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.2d 1103, 1104–06 (N.H. 2001); Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474,
476–77, 484 (Conn. 1990). For discussion, see Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 963, 985–86 (2003); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 181–83
(1992).
100. Lovett, 770 A.2d at 1105.
101. Petriello, 576 A.2d at 477.
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proved compensation for that eight to sixteen percent chance of de-
veloping an ailment she did not yet face and might not in the future
either.102 It is not just doctors. Accountants have been held liable for
bad investments that lose a client potential revenue. And drunk driv-
ers are forced to pay for the income that a dead victim might have
earned—even if the deceased is a minor who never had a job to give
up in the first place.103 Young children usually lack not only any in-
come history, the First Court noted, but even any clearly defined
skills, career goals, or other “characteristics from which [their] earn-
ings [capacity] may be anticipated.”104 So “absent some extraordinary
demonstrations,” it concluded, “there is nothing individual to go
on.”105 Yet courts have not hesitated to approve awards based on the
jury’s “common knowledge and sense of justice,” in the absence of
particularized evidence to quantify that loss of future earnings.106 So
tort law already responds to more than just existing harms. It also re-
dresses certain blocked benefits—employment earnings, investment
returns, or chances for improved health—so long as the injured par-
ties were reasonable to have expected those goods in the future, if
they had not been mistreated.
Professor Keating’s argument has appeal if you feel the loss of what
you had already more intensely than the loss of what you reasonably
expect—your depleted nest egg, as opposed to the future savings. In
other legal contexts, however, the Supreme Court has taken a dim
view of the distinction between harms and benefits. For example, the
Court rejected a harms/benefits-based dividing line for government
takings when it distinguished compensable intrusions on private prop-
erty from takings that the state does not have to pay property owners
for.107 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, explained that “the distinction be-
tween ‘harm-preventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is often in
the eye of the beholder,” depending on nothing less subjective than
“the observer’s evaluation of the relative importance” of the underly-
102. Lovett, 770 A.2d at 1104–06.
103. See Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 325–26 (Minn. 2013); Cast Art Indus. v. KPMG,
36 A.3d 1049, 1051–52 (N.J. 2012); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 So. 2d 1269, 1276–77
(Miss. 2000).
104. D’Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1973).
105. Id.
106. Pipgras v. Hart, 832 S.W.2d 360, 366 (Tex. App. 1992); see also Murray v. Sanford, 487
S.E.2d 135, 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Rubio v. Davis, 500 S.E.2d 367, 371 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998);
C.T.W. v. B.C.G., 809 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex. App. 1991); Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. Nicar,
765 S.W.2d 486, 493–94 (Tex. App. 1989).
107. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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ing activity.108 Whether some regulation gets designated as a “harm”
or “denied benefit” to the people it affects may, in other words, be a
function of implicit judgments about the (in)significance or
(un)worthiness of the activity it targets. These points are not lost on
Professor Keating. He does not scoff at reproductive negligence. And
he appreciates that harms and benefits are just pluses and minuses on
either end of the same scale, one logically identical to the other, ex-
cept that harms are bad and benefits good.
Professor Keating argues that tort law is right to draw a sharp line
between these twin concepts because “[h]arms and benefits stand in
very different relations to autonomy.”109 Here, he echoes an idea that
Professor Arthur Ripstein articulated in his 1999 book, Equality, Re-
sponsibility, and the Law—that “certain security interests are pro-
tected” because of “their importance to leading an autonomous
life.”110 These core interests are the ones Ripstein says we need to
exercise our moral capacity for meaningful choice about the direction
our lives take.111 Professor Seana Shiffrin put the point more sharply
in an article she published that same year in Legal Theory. What dis-
tinguishes harms like pain and property loss, she wrote, is that they
“impose experiential conditions that are affirmatively contrary to
one’s will” or “seriously interfere[ ] with the exercise of agency.”112
Keating picks up where Ripstein and Shiffrin left off twenty years ago,
singling out immediate intrusions on “our bodies and to our posses-
sions” for how acutely they aggravate “the principal means at our dis-
posal” for exerting our wills upon the world.113 Keating says that the
present impairment of these abilities and tools strikes a greater blow
to autonomy than future setbacks that are also less concrete: Sup-
pressing intangible aspirations does not likewise “rob us of our normal
and foundational powers of agency.”114
But blocked benefits are not so different in this respect from harms
to what an individual already has. Unrealized benefits can keep me
from quarterbacking my life just like harms do. Say I have arranged
my life around building a house, or getting a job, or having a child
when a wrongful injury spoils everything just before the last coat of
108. Id. at 1024–26.
109. Keating, supra note 86, at 223.
110. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 55 (1999).
111. Id.
112. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance
of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 123–24 (1999).
113. Keating, supra note 86, at 223.
114. Id. at 216–17 (citing Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV.
1147 (2006)).
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paint, or round of interviews, or stage of pregnancy. That loss is not
singularly less devastating just because I was not quite a homeowner,
employee, or parent. My life can be upended even if I have not moved
in, or gotten a paycheck, or held the baby in my arms.115 Just replace
an historical comparison between my present and past state of affairs,
with a counterfactual one between my present and an alternate uni-
verse in which things went how they were supposed to. What matters
is not so much harm versus unrealized benefit; that is, whether the loss
is to what I already have as opposed to what I otherwise might have
gotten. The important thing is how reasonable I was to have expected
the good or life goal in the first place, and how not getting it
foreseeably affects me.
The distinction between historical and counterfactual comparisons
comes from philosopher Joel Feinberg. He recognized that something
can still be bad for me even if I am no worse off than I was before. If a
surgeon leaves a small blunt medical instrument in my body, I am ac-
tually better off than before the life-saving operation, albeit not nearly
as healthy or happy as I would have been if she had removed the
object.116 Procreation deprived is similar: it leaves my life just as be-
reft of children as it was before, but my reproductive options are
worse for me than if my infertility had been treated in a way that was
not negligent. Besides, it is not all about autonomy—not by far. The
value of infertility treatment has less to do with choices than conse-
quences. More important than individual control over reproductive
decisions is how those decisions help a person live well. Procreation
matters most for its practical impact on health, education, employ-
ment, social standing, intimate relationships, and other critical fea-
tures of well-being. That is why the U.S. Center for Disease Control
and Prevention ranks “family planning” among the “ten great public
health achievements” in the twentieth century.117
Professor Keating has a point when he talks down benefits on the
ground that their putative good for me might not in fact be “congru-
115. See Dov Fox, Making Things Right When Reproductive Medicine Goes Wrong? Reply to
Robert Rabin, Carol Sanger, and Gregory Keating, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 94 (2018),
https://columbialawreview.org/content/making-things-right-when-reproductive-medicine-goes-
wrongreply-to-robert-rabin-carol-sanger-and-gregory-keating/. This article builds upon that
piece in a number of ways, for example, by spelling out how to measure and calculate reproduc-
tive harm.
116. Joel Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in FREEDOM
AND FULFILLMENT 3, 7 (1992).
117. CDC, Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States, 1900-1999, 48 MORBIDITY
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 241 (1999), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/000567-
96.htm.
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ent with [my] will.”118 He explains that to “thrust an unsought benefit
upon [me] and demand compensation . . . for the value conferred”
would conscript me in a project that I have not chosen.119 Getting a
house, or job, or child I did not consent to risks depriving me of the
very autonomy that Keating says tort law is designed to preserve. But
the benefits I hope to derive from IVF or sperm donation are not
unsolicited. Patients seek out these services with the express purpose
of having a child. When specialists frustrate that purpose, it foists a
lifetime of childlessness on patients who made clear their preference
to grow their family. These injuries disorder their lives no less than
“broken bones, crippling pain, [or] significant disability.”120 Wrong-
fully denying a person the chance to reproduce erodes his agency and
self-determination too. But there are more practical reasons than indi-
vidual autonomy that explain why tort law privileges existing harms
over future benefits. The main one is that the loss of a benefit is
harder to prove and calculate.
That benefits have not yet happened clouds what might have been
realized and obscures the value of goods that never were. Suppose
two reckless drivers each crash their car into another one around the
corner from a hospital’s labor and delivery wing. One of those other
vehicles was on its way home after childbirth, and one was on its way
there to give birth. While the collision claims the life of the newborn
leaving the hospital, it also causes the arriving would-be-mother to
miscarry. Why should tort law distinguish so conspicuously between
the two cases, allowing full recovery in the first and forbidding it alto-
gether in the second? The clearest difference between the two cases
has nothing to do with reproductive autonomy, but rather perceptual
vividness. Even the most striking ultrasound images will not let you
hold or hear a fetus. By contrast, it is hard not to be moved by the
sound of your baby’s cry or how her hand feels wrapping around your
finger.121 The Supreme Court of California reflected on the opacity of
prenatal loss in a 1977 wrongful death case involving negligent hospi-
tal midwives:
The parents of a stillborn fetus have never known more than a mys-
terious presence dimly sensed by random movements in the womb
[whereas] the mother and father of a child born alive have seen,
touched, and heard their baby, have witnessed his developing per-
sonality, and have started the lifelong process of communicating
118. Keating, supra note 86, at 223.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 215 (citing Seana Shiffrin, Harm and Its Moral Significance, 18 LEGAL THEORY 357
(2012)).
121. Steven D. Smith, Missing Persons, 2 NEV. L.J. 590, 598, 602–03 (2002).
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and interacting with him. These are the rich experiences upon which
a meaningful parent-child relationship is built, and they do not be-
gin until the moment of birth.122
And yet certain features of the long-awaited potential offspring are
not all that hard for prospective parents to conjure up. The expected
child occupies an overriding role in their life that no other person
could. While the precise contours and consequences of a losing an ex-
pected child will be uncertain, this loss can still be projected clearly
and confidently enough to sustain a remedy in tort. That is why most
courts treat the two car accidents similarly. Courts compensate for a
baby’s wrongful death, whether before or after her first breath. The
amount might vary, but if a court awards damages when a child “dies
immediately after birth,” it also does for “a stillborn child.”123 Profes-
sor Keating would approach these cases differently. Only after a
wanted child arrives do parents enjoy goods associated with her tangi-
ble place in their life, such that her loss would substantially impair
their ability to plan it. Before her birth, these parental goods are not
yet theirs to lose. Acquiring those benefits might “enlarge the reach”
of their will, he grants, but not getting them does not impair it.124
UNBORN PERSONHOOD OR PROPERTY
When frozen sperm, eggs, or embryos go missing or are damaged,
plaintiffs have sued for “wrongful destruction” or “wrongful death,”
comparing reproductive materials to property or persons. Neither
strategy has found much success in courts, but that has not stopped
victims from asserting them. Wendy and Rick Penniman brought a
“wrongful death” claim against the freezer-failure clinic in Cleveland,
and asked the court to call their three IVF embryos “persons.”125 In a
1986 Supreme Court case, Justice Byron White rightly described an
embryo (or fetus) as “an entity that bears in its cells all the genetic
information that . . . distinguishes an individual member of this species
from all others.”126 But the Court has long maintained that even a
late-stage fetus lacks any constitutional rights of its own that could
122. Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 133 (Cal. 1977) (en banc).
123. Smith v. Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 560 N.E.2d 1164, 1171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). See also
Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 638
(La. 1981); Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Mo. 1995); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf
Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 790–91 (S.D. 1996); Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 533 (W. Va. 1995).
124. Keating, supra note 86, at 217.
125. Penniman v. Univ. Hosps. Health Sys., Inc., 130 N.E.3d 333, 338–39 (Ohio Ct. App.
2019).
126. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting).
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override a woman’s decision to end her pregnancy.127 Just because a
gestating fetus does not count as a person for purposes of abortion
rights and regulations, does not necessarily mean that a frozen embryo
cannot be thought of as a person in the distinct context of negligence
actions involving the unborn’s destruction by others. Embryos need
not be afforded any rights of their own to allow embryo-denied
couples to sue for “wrongful death.” But that does not make these
lawsuits a good idea.
The peculiar history of the wrongful death tort explains how claims
involving the unborn can hang together with constitutional rights to
abortion. Legislatures enacted wrongful death statutes to fill an unten-
able gap in the early common law. Negligence liability for serious inju-
ries attached only if a plaintiff survived—if he died, the defendant
went scot-free.128 Wrongful death suits were designed to deter miscon-
duct and compensate the victim’s survivors, however imperfectly. A
coal miner’s widow explained, “It’s not about the money . . . I don’t
want this to happen to anyone else’s husband. I want the company to
make things safer. But the money is the only thing you are allowed to
sue for.”129 Whatever solace or sense of vindication money might pro-
vide, neither existing life, nor a hoped-for one, is not a fungible or
replaceable good like “a stock, car, home, or other such item bought
and sold in some marketplace.”130 Originally, recovery was allowed
only for economic losses like funeral expenses and a loved one’s lost
wages. Most jurisdictions now let wrongful-death plaintiffs recover for
emotional distress and other nonpecuniary losses of companionship
and peace of mind. This allowed parents to recover for the wrongful
death of relatives and other dependents whose death did not set them
back financially, including children whose injuries had been inflicted
before they were born.131 But this expansion to infant deaths resulting
from harms incurred during pregnancy invited yet another dilemma.
Wrongful death now afforded relief to new parents whose fetuses sur-
vived until birth, but not those whose fetuses were hurt so bad that
they died before they were born. Remedies were slighter for a graver
harm.
127. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161, 163 (1973).
128. See Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1062–66
(1965).
129. See Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for Justice Through Compensation for
Personal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 417 n.2 (2003) (quoting Lisa Belkin, Just
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92).
130. Loth v. Truck-a-Way, 60 Cal. App. 4th 757, 767 (1998).
131. William Prosser & W. Page Keeton, THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984).
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To address this paradox, the majority of states expanded the action
once more—this time to cover fetuses capable of surviving on their
own. Since wrongful death statutes applied only to the death of a
“person,” this move required defining fetuses as persons—but just for
the narrowly circumscribed purpose of allowing would-have-been par-
ents to recover. Their claim for the wrongful death of a viable fetus
speaks to the devastating loss that would-be-parents endure when
negligence ends their wanted pregnancy. It does not entitle the fetus
itself to make claims on others, including the woman.132 Claims for
wrongful prenatal death are allowed only for fetal deaths incurred
during the final trimester—not any earlier in pregnancy. Every court
that has considered the “wrongful death” of IVF embryos has rejected
the claim on the ground that the term “person” or “human being”
does not apply to frozen embryos under the meaning of this doctrine
in that state.133 But courts need not declare lost embryos “people” to
recognize that plaintiffs like the Pennimans have suffered a profound
loss, or that apologies and refunds alone are not enough to redress the
negligent destruction of their reproductive cells.
The reason that states can ban abortion later in pregnancy is not
that viable fetuses have rights of their own. In Roe v. Wade, the Court
held that it is because the state has an “important and legitimate” in-
terest in “potential life”; an interest whose strength grows as a fetus
does and becomes compelling once it develops the capacity for
“meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”134 The interest belongs
to the state, not the fetus. So, thinking about the fetus as the kind of
entity subject to “wrongful death” coheres with government interests
in preserving fetal life. Courts have entitled not-yet-implanted em-
bryos to far less deference, albeit more than mere property or bodily
cells, on account of their “potential to become a person.”135 This inter-
mediate status—“greater than that accorded to human tissues” like
blood or hair, but less than a person—is what the Tennessee Supreme
Court assigned to embryos in a 1992 divorce action between Mary Sue
and Junior Davis.136 They agreed on all terms of the dissolution except
what to do with the seven embryos that they had cryopreserved while
132. See, e.g., Carranza v. United States, 267 P.3d 912, 916–17 (Utah 2011); Summerfield v.
Super. Ct., 698 P.2d 712, 715, 724 (Ariz. 1985).
133. See McClain v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 665 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003); Miccolis v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 587 A.2d 67, 71 (R.I. 1991); Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So.2d
1241, 1244 (Ala. 1993); Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1261–62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005);
Miller v. Am. Infertility Grp. of Ill., 897 N.E.2d 837, 839–40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 151, 163 (1973).
135. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992).
136. Id. at 596.
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they were married. She wanted to use them to get pregnant; he
wanted them donated to a childless couple.137 Tennessee’s designation
of “special respect” has been widely adopted to resolve embryo dispo-
sition disputes in other states.138
Say courts declare that embryos deserve this special respect when it
comes to “custody” battles or tort remedies. That legal conclusion
would not require affording embryos that higher status in disputes
arising in other contexts like stem cell research or abortion. The law
can compartmentalize concepts and definitions into (and out of) par-
ticular domains. But political line-drawing and spillover is a different
matter. Treating embryos as persons under any discrete part of the law
plausibly risks the politically charged implication of embryonic per-
sonhood everywhere. Calling embryos “persons”—even for the sole
purpose of wrongful-death recovery—could bolster the cause of those
who would restrict practices like IVF and stem cell research that in-
volve foreseeable damage to embryos.139 Today, IVF patients in every
state except Louisiana can do what they want with any embryos they
created and do not ultimately use.140 Recognition of wrongful death
for lost embryos could provide support for legislative proposals to
limit embryo creation, mandate “adoption” of unused IVF embryos,
and force female patients who do not get pregnant after the first cycle
to undergo additional rounds of painful egg retrieval.141 At any rate,
no American court has ever defined lost embryos as “persons” under
the meaning of statutes authorizing plaintiffs to sue for wrongful
death.142
Judges have been more open to think of reproductive materials as
something closer to property. This willingness has been halfhearted,
however, and mostly limited to disputes over what to do with frozen
sperm, eggs, and embryos that are not lost at all, but caught in a tug of
war.143 One California case involved a posthumous battle over frozen
137. Id. at 589.
138. See, e.g., Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1270–71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Mc-
Queen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 148–49 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
139. See Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 2011); Sarah Zhang, Can Lost Embryos
Give Rise to a Wrongful-Death Suit?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
health/archive/2018/04/fertility-clinic-embryos/557258/.
140. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:128 (2009).
141. See I. Glenn Cohen, Dov Fox & Eli Adashi, Losing Embryos, Finding Justice: Life, Lib-
erty, and the Pursuit of Personhood, 169 ANN. INT. MED. 800, 801 (2018).
142. See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying text.
143. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1135, 1139–41 (2008).
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sperm.144 Before Bill Kane committed suicide, he willed twelve vials
of frozen sperm to his girlfriend, Deborah Hecht, so that she could
have his child after he died. His grown children wanted the sperm
removed from his estate and destroyed. A state appellate court ruled
that the decision was up to Hecht.145 The court called the sperm a
“unique form of ‘property.’”146 The California Supreme Court denied
review, letting the appellate decision stand to resolve Hecht’s quarrel
with Kane’s children. But it also decertified the judgment as precedent
that would have any legal authority in future cases.147 A Virginia deci-
sion accorded similar property interests to the progenitors of frozen
embryos.148 That case pitted fertility patients Steven York and Risa
Adler-York against the Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine,
which refused to transfer the couple’s embryos to another clinic after
multiple efforts at the Jones Institute had failed. The court held that
the embryos had to be returned in the same way a valet service or
parking garage has to give back people’s cars.149 But that was only
because the Institute had “consistently refer[red] to” the embryos “as
the ‘property’ of the Yorks in the Cryopreservation Agreement” be-
tween them.150
Courts resist the implications of propertizing embryos in another
kind of dispute—between former spouses over what to do with the
frozen embryos they had created together at a happier time in their
relationship. “Equating [embryos] with washing machines and jewelry
borders on the absurd,” courts insist.151 They have reluctantly classi-
fied embryos as “marital property,” in the limited sense of nonperson
entities acquired during the marriage. But that does not mean that
embryos can be sold on the open market. Judges use “property” here
as a legal term of art that designates control over how something can
be used. Any “interest in the nature of ownership” over frozen em-
bryos is limited to “decision-making authority concerning the[ir] dis-
position.” Courts explain that recognizing these narrow property
interests in embryos is consistent with affording them the “special re-
spect” they deserve by virtue of “their potential for human life” and
144. See Hecht v. Super. Ct., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), depublished by Hecht
v. Super. Ct., 1997 Cal. LEXIS 131 (Cal. 1997).
145. Id. at 227–28.
146. Id. at 226.
147. Id.
148. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
149. Id. at 425 (court analyzes the bailor-bailee relationship between the parties).
150. Id.
151. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 235
A.D.2d 150 (App. Div. 1997), aff’d, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 29 21-APR-20 12:00
2020] REDRESSING FUTURE INTANGIBLE LOSSES 447
“symbolic meaning for many people.”152 There is nonetheless an un-
deniable “awkwardness” to treating embryos as “personal
property.”153
This body of law faces other problems in trying to resolve negli-
gently mishandled embryos. One is that property disputes involve
contested ownership claims. This might work for reproductive dis-
putes between (ex-) husband and wife, clinic and patients, or the dece-
dent’s girlfriend and his children—with each party vying for control
over existing entities whose whereabouts are known. But for profes-
sional negligence, when frozen tissues decompose or go unaccounted
for, no competing party claims them as her own. Lost sex cells are just
that—lost. Rules for misappropriated property could still be adapted
to missing or destroyed eggs or embryos, but remedies are con-
strained. It is not just that compensation levels would be too low. The
vocabulary of property law cannot articulate the meaning of these
losses or compute a suitable remedy for their defeat.154
The task of determining damages came to the forefront in the first-
ever IVF lawsuit in the United States, in which three couples sued for
the loss of their total of nine embryos. The state court in Frisina v.
Women and Infants Hospital of Rhode Island allowed the families to
recover for the missing embryos “based on the loss of irreplaceable
property.”155 The court had a hard time pinpointing the basis for
awards. There’s no market for frozen embryos, so they lack commer-
cial value—but so do lots of other unique forms of personal property
like family heirlooms or custom-made suits.156 “Replacement cost” is
one option, but age, health, or other factors may make it too late for
progenitors to replace lost reproductive materials. What about the
price of creating them? That would be small change for sperm, a few
thousand dollars for eggs, a couple more for procedures to create em-
bryos and store them, plus time and resources expended. This is the
kind of tallying that courts have applied to assess damages for the
wrongful destruction of research materials.157
But embryo loss has far greater significance and meaning for people
who had sought to reproduce rather than experiment with them.
Courts, like the one in Frisina, struggle mightily to translate defeated
152. Id.
153. In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 838–39 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
154. See Judith D. Fischer, Misappropriation of Human Eggs and Embryos and the Tort of
Conversion: A Relational View, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 381, 419 (1999).
155. Frisina v. Women & Infants Hosp. of R.I., No. CIV. A. 95-4037, 2002 WL 1288784, at *9,
*10 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002).
156. See Sell v. Ward, 81 Ill. App. 675, 678 (1898).
157. See United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1100 (D. Md. 1994).
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life plans under the auspices of property law. The closest analogy that
the court could find was a basement flooding that caused the “discom-
fort” and “annoyance” of being denied the use of one’s home.158 Be-
ing robbed of one’s prospects for procreation is a weightier kind of
injury, one whose repercussions reach further than inconveniences or
sentimentalities. Casting that loss as tantamount to the nuisance of
damaged property distorts and devalues the kinds of harm that repro-
ductive negligence characteristically inflicts. Property law misses the
real losses sustained and corresponding damages owed. Courts resist
treating frozen gametes or embryos as the kinds of entities that people
can own or put a price tag on. And they get stuck trying to appraise
thwarted family plans in terms of damaged possessions. Neither the
cost of procedures to extract eggs nor the symbolic value of embryos
created can capture their worth.
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The personality torts were radical because civil recovery for wrong-
ful injury usually requires harm to the victim’s person or possessions.
Even today, the Supreme Court maintains that emotional harm alone
does not qualify for compensation under circumstances in which mod-
est bodily injuries would.159 The modern precedent comes from
1997.160 A train track pipefitter named Michael Buckley was among
the “snowmen of Grand Central,” so called because the end of each
workday saw them covered with white insulation dust.161 It was asbes-
tos. Buckley’s employer, Metro-North Railroad, conceded that it was
wrong to have used the known carcinogen. Wracked by anxiety that
his prolonged exposure to the known carcinogen would inflict a slow
and painful death, Buckley sued the company for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Medical checkups did not turn up any signs that
he had asbestos-related diseases. Then again, it can take years before
a person who has inhaled the toxic fibers develops mesothelioma, as-
bestosis, or lung cancer. And many never do. Symptoms of these
often-fatal diseases do not manifest until down the road.162 The Court
would not let Buckley recover for his present fear because that mental
angst could not be readily discerned. The majority worried that claims
of emotional harm alone are too easy to fake and too hard to dis-
158. Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *9 (citing Hawkins v. Scituate Oil, 723 A.2d 771 (R.I.
1999)).
159. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 439 (1997).
160. See generally id.
161. Id. at 446.
162. Id. at 446, 427.
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prove. Plaintiffs or their attorneys could cook up any heartache and
lay it on thick through poignant accounts that defendants would be
hard-pressed to dispute. To “distinguish between reliable and serious
claims” of emotional anguish from “unreliable and relatively trivial”
ones, the Court refused to remedy Buckley’s injury without proof that
he had also suffered physical or economic harm.163
Lower courts pile on concerns that run deeper than problems with
evidence and risk of fraud. They add that “mental distress of a trivial
and transient nature is part and parcel of everyday life.”164 The ubiq-
uity of fleeting anxieties leaves judges wary of catering to oversensi-
tive victims or “curry[ing] to neurotic patterns in the population.”165
These considerations help to explain the barriers that American tort
law puts up in the way of recovery for freestanding emotional harm.166
Plaintiffs have variously been required to show that intangible loss
was connected to: first, bodily injury; then, physical impact; and, fi-
nally, probable, imminent corporeal consequences, or “zone of dan-
ger”—as in the near-miss case of a nose-diving plane whose
passengers do not crash.167 Professor Robert Rabin notes that “the
zone-of-danger limitation, as a practical matter, has a built-in thresh-
old that further constrains the floodgates concern: most near-miss
claims would be regarded as de minimis by a trier of fact and hence
are very unlikely to be brought.”168 Where courts entertain claims for
emotional distress, they set the bar high, demanding proof of grave
and lasting damage. A bystander who witnesses a horrific accident
cannot recover, however grave his panic or manifest his shock, unless
he is “closely related” to the victim, “present at the scene of the [phys-
ical] injury,” and “aware” of it in real time.169 Courts reject claims for
missing embryos, switched donors, and failed birth control on the
ground that victims do not experience “present and demonstrable
physical injury”170 and did not witness “the occurrence which caused”
their emotional distress.171 Nor do any resulting children, back when
163. Id. at 444, 433 (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 (1994)); see also
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 157–58 (2003). For discussion, see Dov Fox & Alex
Stein, Dualism and Doctrine, 90 IND. L.J. 975, 985–86 (2015).
164. Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970).
165. Id.
166. See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 144–45 (1992).
167. See Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
168. See Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of Constraint, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1197, 1199 n.11 (2009).
169. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829–30 (Cal. 1989) (en banc).
170. Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del., 581 A.2d 288, 293 (Del. 1989).
171. Arche v. United States, 798 P.2d 477, 482 (Kan. 1990).
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embryos or sex cells, count as the kind of “victims” to which their
future parents might claim relation or proximity at the scene.172
Recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires
that the defendant’s misconduct be “outrageous.”173 Deliberate repro-
ductive malfeasance is not just the stuff of dystopian dramas (Hand-
maid’s Tale), quirky comedies (Almost Famous), and Law & Order
episodes.174 DNA kits like 23andMe and Ancestry.com have exposed
four doctors who inseminated patients decades ago using their own
sperm.175 Clinics in New York and Texas stole eggs and embryos from
their patients.176 And in the mid-1990s, a Pulitzer-winning investiga-
tion by the Orange County Register exposed a web of cover-ups, em-
ployee intimidation, and hush money payments at UC Irvine’s Center
for Reproductive Health.177 Fertility specialist Ricardo Asch and his
medical partners took eggs from patients without their consent, mixed
and matched them with sperm from others, and implanted the result-
ing embryos into different people.178 Especially for intentional wrongs
like these, but also for reproductive negligence, concerns about open-
ing the floodgates to disingenuous claims do not justify restricting
remedies for emotional distress. Would-be cheats face too many hoops
to jump through—they would have to stage costly or invasive proce-
dures and produce contemporaneous evidence reliable enough to sub-
stantiate their asserted reproductive plans. To weed out smoke and
172. Id.; Garrison, 581 A.2d at 293.
173. See Lawson v. Mgmt. Activities, Inc., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
174. See The Handmaid’s Tale: Nolite Te Bastardes Carborundorum (Hulu television broad-
cast, May 3, 2017); Sisters: Episode 1.1 (Fox television broadcast, 2019); Law & Order: Special
Victims Unit: Inconceivable (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 22, 2008).
175. See Rowlette v. Mortimer, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1018 (D. Idaho 2018); Ken Kusmer,
Donald Cline, Indianapolis Fertility Doctor, Used Own Sperm to Impregnate Women: Affidavit,
WASH. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/12/donald-cline-
indianapolis-fertility-doctor-used-ow/; Lawsuit Claims Former Fertility Doctor Used His Own
Sperm, BBC NEWS: U.S. & CAN. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
37842458 [https://perma.cc/MCK5-7TN5]; Matthew Piper, Report: Utah Kidnapper Is Woman’s
Father Due to Semen Switch, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 10, 2014, 10:18 AM), http://archive.sltrib.
com/story.php?ref=/Sltrib/news/57372964-78/lippert-says-family-daughter.html.csp; Conviction
Upheld in Fertility Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at B11.
176. See Saleh v. Hollinger, 335 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Tex. App. 2011); Del Zio v. Presbyterian
Hosp., No. 74 Civ. 3588 (CES), 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1978).
177. See MARY DODGE & GILBERT GEIS, STEALING DREAMS: A FERTILITY CLINIC SCANDAL
190 (2003).
178. The scandal made international news and triggered state senate hearings. The school
shelled out over $24 million to settle complaints by more than 137 families. See Prato-Morrison
v. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); MARY DODGE & GILBERT GEIS, STEAL-
ING DREAMS: A FERTILITY CLINIC SCANDAL 190 (2003); Kimi Yoshino, UCI Settles Dozens of
Fertility Suits, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/11/local/me-uci-
fertility11.
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mirrors, courts need only ask for hard-to-fake medical records, cor-
roborating witnesses, and long-term preparations. Even if the absence
of physical harm did invite “greater opportunity for fraud,” the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has explained, that threat would “not warrant
courts of law in closing the door to all cases of that class.”179
Yet tort law is reluctant to compensate freestanding emotional dis-
tress. Outside of the reproductive context, courts have made three
main exceptions. First are cases in which doctors or other medical spe-
cialists misdiagnose a potentially fatal disease, like telling a patient he
has cancer or AIDS when he does not.180 In the second class of com-
plaints, military or law enforcement professionals inform family mem-
bers that their loved ones died when they have not.181 The last
exception is the most common today. It involves the mishandling of
corpses, such as cremating a body intended for burial. When plaintiffs
win in negligent-infliction cases like these, courts rely on the collective
judgment of juries to come up with damages for standalone emotional
harm: Awards of between $200,000 and $450,000 for the wrongful loss
or destruction of a relative’s corpse have recently been approved.182
Judges have singled out three features of these dead-body cases that
justify special recovery.183 First is that the social practice at stake is
deeply valued across our moral culture—honoring loved ones by dis-
posing of their remains in accordance with religious rituals, family tra-
ditions, or parting wishes.184 Second is the considerable degree of faith
that vulnerable victims, such as grief-stricken mourners, place in the
hands of professionals, like undertakers, morticians, coroners, em-
balmers, and funeral directors.185 Third is the lack of alternate mea-
sures to deter misconduct. The departed themselves cannot bring a
claim if their survivors are not allowed to.186
179. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 918 (Cal. 1968) (citing Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 431
(1955)).
180. See, e.g., Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789 (D.C. 2011) (en banc);
Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 203–05 (Alaska 1995).
181. See, e.g., W. Union v. Smith, 227 S.W. 1111, 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Young v. W.
Union Tel. Co., 11 S.E. 1044, 1045 (N.C. 1890).
182. See Smith v. Telophase Nat. Cremation Soc., Inc., 471 So. 2d 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Akins Funeral Home, Inc. v. Miller, 878 So. 2d 267 (Ala. 2003); Guth v. Freeland, 28 P.3d
982, 990 (Haw. 2001).
183. See Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 190, 196–97 (Cal. 1991); Quesada v. Oak
Hill Improvement Co., 261 Cal.App.3d 596, 610 (1989); Draper Mortuary v. Superior Court, 185
Cal. Rptr. 396, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
184. See St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. White, 91 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Ark. 1936).
185. See Guth, 28 P.3d at 989.
186. See Gregory C. Keating, Is Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress a Freestanding
Tort?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1165–66, 1173–74 (2009).
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Reproductive losses register close parallels along all three dimen-
sions. First, efforts to have or avoid children occupy a central place in
people’s lives. Bringing a new member into one’s family can be as
emotionally charged and fraught as losing an old one. In 2008, a Con-
necticut court expressly analogized the “dignity interest” in “preserv-
ing the potential for human reproduction” to giving the deceased a
“comfortable and dignified resting place.”187 Second, family members
rely on specialists fully in matters of procreation, as in matters of
death. A 2018 federal court in Idaho explained that the “position of
trust” assumed by reproductive health care professionals gives them
special “access to, and power over, areas of life that are unusually
intimate and sacred.”188 Finally, no better-suited plaintiff emerges to
help discipline the mishandling of human materials at the beginning of
life, like at its end. Potential children have no more standing to sue
than the deceased. Yet courts rarely carve out similar emotional-dis-
tress exceptions when professional misconduct deprives people of
wanted procreation.
Just three courts—among scores—have awarded any limited recov-
ery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.189 These three
courts are extreme outliers, and two of them leaned hard on excep-
tional circumstances of religion and race to justify exempting plaintiffs
deprived of procreation from the usual physical injury requirement.190
Carmen Martinez was a devout Catholic who regarded abortion as a
sin “except under exceptional circumstances.”191 She and her husband
Arthur eagerly awaited the arrival of their fifth child. But her doctor
recommended abortion. He informed her that a medication she had
been taking when the couple conceived critically risked that their
“baby would be born with the congenital birth defect of microcephaly
(small brain) or anencephaly (no brain).”192 When Martinez balked at
the prospect of terminating her pregnancy, her doctor pressed:
I don’t think you realize how serious this is . . . the baby would need
machines to do what the brain couldn’t do, would probably need
machines to breathe, that it would have to be fed intravenously, that
this baby was never going to leave the hospital, that the baby would
be another Karen Quinlan.193
187. Witt v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 977 A.2d 779, 791 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008).
188. Rowlette v. Mortimer, 352 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1017–18 (D. Idaho 2018).
189. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 9–24.
190. See Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1987); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
191. Martinez, 512 N.E.2d at 538.
192. Id.
193. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 54, Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512
N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1987).
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Quinlan was the woman at the center of the landmark right-to-die
case decided a few years prior—irreversible brain damage had left her
in a persistent vegetative state.194 Martinez decided to abort. Two days
later, the doctor learned that he had gravely overstated the risk of
fetal abnormality.195 It turned out there was no reason to think that
her baby would not have been perfectly healthy. A fetal autopsy con-
firmed it. Martinez was in a complete state of shock for over a year
after “being misinformed that her fetus was hopelessly malformed and
that an abortion [had not been] necessary.”196 According to court doc-
uments, she couldn’t function well at all and didn’t want to go any-
where or enjoy doing anything anymore.197 The feeling that Martinez
had killed her own baby racked her with guilt and “permanently al-
tered her life.”198 The court held the doctor liable, but only for “the
psychological injury directly caused by her agreeing to an act which, as
the jury found, was contrary to her firmly held beliefs” and “deep-
seated convictions” about abortion.199
Another case involved two infertile couples, the Rogers and the
Fasanos, who were receiving treatment at the same clinic.200 They
would occasionally bump into each another there. The husbands,
Robert Rogers and Richard Fasano, would exchange small talk while
their wives, Deborah Rogers and Donna Fasano, were being treated
for ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval. The women were scheduled
for implantation on the same morning, but only Mrs. Fasano got preg-
nant. She ended up giving birth to two baby boys. One looked like the
Fasanos, who are white; the other like the Rogers, who are black. The
Rogers were awarded custody of their biological child and sued the
doctor. He had implanted one of their embryos in Mrs. Fasano, and
194. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647.
195. Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 504 N.Y.S.2d 693, 694 (1986) (Gibbon,
J., dissenting), rev’d, 512 N.E.2d 538 (1987).
196. Id.
197. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 193, at 2–4.
198. Id. at 2.
199. Martinez, 512 N.E.2d at 538–39. The original jury verdict awarded Carmen Martinez
$125,000 and Arthur Martinez $25,000. In 1986, New York’s Second Department Appellate Divi-
sion reversed this judgment based on holding that “[n]o cause of action exists to recover solely
upon a claim of emotional injuries suffered by a mother as the result of physical harm done to
her child in utero.” Martinez, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 693. In 1987, the Court of Appeals reversed the
Second Department’s opinion and remanded the case back to the Second Division Appellate
Department for further proceedings, holding: “Under these unusual circumstances, where there
is a breach of a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, the breach of that duty resulting directly in
emotional harm is actionable.” Martinez, 512 N.E.2d at 539. Upon remittitur, the Second De-
partment Appellate Division found that the plaintiffs had successfully proved their cause of ac-
tion; however, they found the jury award excessive and declined to reinstate it.
200. See Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 2000).
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another of theirs in some other patient the clinic could not identify.201
The court awarded the Rogers damages for the “emotional harm
caused by their having been deprived of the opportunity of experienc-
ing pregnancy, prenatal bonding and the birth of their child,” and for
the fear “that the child that they wanted so desperately . . . might be
born to someone else and that they might never know his or her
fate.”202 But the court narrowly restricted compensation to those
claims that could be substantiated by medical receipts and affidavits
about the economic measure of psychological treatment that they
could demonstrate the mix-up took on them.203
The final example involves Carolyn Witt and her husband Thomas.
They were planning to have a family together when she was diagnosed
with breast cancer.204 Lifesaving radiation therapy would leave her in-
fertile, so she had a doctor at Yale New Haven Hospital remove the
ovarian tissue she would need to have children and keep it safe until
the couple was ready. But when that time came, they learned that the
hospital had “unilaterally discarded it without consulting or even noti-
fying the Witts.”205 The mistake “foreclose[d] the potential for the
plaintiffs to ever conceive a child together.”206 Even though that loss
incurred no bodily injury, the court found the hospital liable for hav-
ing “creat[ed] an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress.”207
Even still, no damages were ultimately awarded.208 And these are out-
liers in favor of allowing recovery when reproduction is deprived.
Most suits of this kind are dismissed outright.
Signs of change can be gleaned in the most recent edition of the
American Restatement of Torts, a widely cited legal treatise that sum-
marizes general principles of tort law.209 The 2012 Restatement would
forgo the physical manifestation requirement for negligently inflicted
injuries sustained in the course of activities “fraught with the risk of
201. See id. at 21–22, 29–30, 28–29; Jim Yardley, After Embryo Mix-Up, Couple Say They Will
Give Up a Baby, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/30/nyregion/after-
embryo-mix-up-couple-say-they-will-give-up-a-baby.html; Jim Yardley, Sharing Baby Proves
Rough on 2 Mothers, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/30/nyregion/
about-new-york-sharing-baby-proves-rough-on-2-mothers.html?ref=topics.
202. Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 723 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (App. Div. 2001).
203. See id. at 29–30.
204. See Witt v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 977 A.2d 779 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008).
205. Id. at 795.
206. Id. at 788.
207. Id.
208. The court let the case move forward on counts of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress to both Carolyn and her husband (as well as intentional infliction to Carolyn). The action
was withdrawn before ever going to trial.
209. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM (AM. LAW INST.
2012).
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emotional harm.”210 The Restatement did not specify relevant fac-
tors—a professional relationship or contractual obligation, for exam-
ple—that might qualify for exemption from the general bar on
recovery for mental distress that is not physically apparent. It left
judges to identify contexts in which plaintiffs must show “credible evi-
dence” of “serious” harms that they were not idiosyncratic or unrea-
sonable to experience.211 And courts have so far applied this relaxed
standard sparingly,212 limiting recovery for purely emotional distress
to legal malpractice in child custody or criminal defense cases that
lead clients to lose visitation rights or be wrongfully incarcerated.213
Allowing people to recover for the emotional harm of losing out on
the chance to reproduce would be a start. Anxiety, disappointment,
and sorrow are certainly part of any such loss. And declining to rem-
edy that wrongful denial does not simply punt these determinations to
a lower court or another day. It takes clear sides on the authenticity
and magnitude of these losses: Refusing to redress them denies, at
least implicitly, that the law considers those injuries real or serious
enough to matter. But these losses cannot plausibly be described
harmless errors. We are not talking about mis-prescribed abortion
pills that result in a healthy pregnancy anyway, or dropped embryos
that still leave enough left over to have children. These are longed-for
dreams of pregnancy and genetic parenthood that misconduct shat-
ters, for now or forever.
MEASURING REPRODUCTIVE INJURIES
Some will decry recovery for reproductive losses as too arbitrary
and prone to abuse. They will say that there is no sound way to trans-
late such unfamiliar and imprecise harms into hard-and-fast dollar
amounts; no objective test to appraise the severity of injuries that de-
pend so heavily on subjective testimony; no clear mechanism to chan-
nel legislative or judicial deliberations about corresponding damage
awards; or, no market value available to set principled limits within
some ceiling or floor.214 But just because reproductive injuries can be
nebulous does not mean they are not “concrete,” at least not in the
210. Id. § 47 & cmt. B.
211. Id.
212. See Bylsma v. Burger King Corp., 293 P.3d 1168, 1171, 1172 (Wash. 2013) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
213. See Vincent v. DeVries, 72 A.3d 886, 890–97 (Vt. 2013); Miranda v. Said, 836 N.W.2d 8,
27–28 (Iowa 2013).
214. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 772, 779 (1985); Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 224–25 (1953).
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“usual meaning” the Supreme Court has ascribed to that term—
namely, “‘real, and not ‘abstract.’”215 Not getting the baby you
wanted, or getting one you did not, is a harm in fact, not just in theory.
“Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize . . . intan-
gible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”216 This is why, as far back
as 1931, the Court let a paper company recover for intangible injuries
arising from a competitor’s antitrust violation.217 Its decision in Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. authorized damage
awards as “a matter of just and reasonable inference,” even though no
harm “could be measured and expressed in figures not based on spec-
ulation and conjecture.”218
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertain-
ment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perver-
sion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the
injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any
amend for his acts.219
The Court also affirmed the principle that “the risk of the uncertainty
[in measuring damages] should be thrown upon the wrongdoer instead
of upon the injured party.”220 A Michigan court sharpened this point
in a wrongful death case thirty years later: “[I]t is not the privilege of
him whose wrongful act caused the loss to hide behind the uncertain-
ties inherent in the very situation his wrong has created.”221
Indeterminacy and incommensurability complicate remedies for re-
productive harms, but not uniquely or prohibitively so. Hard as it is to
value the loss of pregnancy and parenthood, it is not so much easier to
come up with suitable dollar awards for claims of nuisance, trespass,
or slander—let alone torts like wrongful death, wrongful conviction,
and wrongful imprisonment. Yet courts do it all the time. That injuries
to life, liberty, and dignity cannot be quantified with anything like pre-
cision does not justify refusing compensation outright. The same goes
for the humiliation of privacy intrusion, betrayal of fiduciary breach,
or even “wrongful living” when medical providers resuscitate some-
215. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 472 (1971).
216. Id. at 1548–49. This was a case about standing to sue in federal court under Article III of
the U.S. Constitution, as opposed to the substance of tort claims under state law. The require-
ments for standing doctrine and substantive claims differ, but courts tend to think about the
concept of harm similarly in both.
217. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
218. Id. at 563.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 561, 565. For discussion in the context of wrongful life claims, see Berman v. Allan,
404 A.2d 8, 14 (N.J. 1979).
221. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Mich. 1960).
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one whose healthcare directives clearly said not to.222 Courts should
not throw up their hands just because these losses require care to enu-
merate or appraise. So too with the thwarting of reproductive inter-
ests.223 The principal harm is not the lost choice or capacity to
conceive and gestate.224 It is the ways in which plaintiffs are affected
by being denied  the associated experiences and identities. These are
subjective injuries to individual well-being.
Damages should depend on how much plaintiffs actually suffer. The
impact will usually go beyond the “shock of discovering” that
parenthood will take a radically different shape,225 or even the “psy-
chological trauma” of being deprived the child a couple “wanted so
desperately.”226 There are also the frayed marriages, disordered iden-
tities, and enduring senses of loneliness or isolation that these mishaps
can leave in their wake.227 Americans rate their inability to conceive
or carry a wanted child as about as devastating as divorce or diagnosis
with a terminal illness.228
In life and in law, people need not beget nor bear a child in order to
be the child’s parents—adults with primary responsibility for sus-
taining and promoting his or her welfare and development. What
makes a parent, in the complete and meaningful sense of that role, is
this kind of functional and enduring caretaking, full stop. People who
adopt a child are no less that child’s parents just because they lack
shared DNA and fetal bonding. But the flourishing of adoptive fami-
lies and availability of adoption, at least for some, does not negate the
wrongful denial of a sought-after biological affinity that many Ameri-
cans experience as a loss.229 For those who believe that “DNA binds a
222. See Campbell v. Delbridge, 670 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Iowa 2003); Callison v. Hillcrest
Healthcare Sys., No. CJ-2010-3197, 2011 WL 7990001 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cnty. Apr. 14, 2011).
223. See infra notes 116–117 and accompanying text.
224. The capability approach, developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, places em-
phasis on people’s substantive freedom to choose from among sets of valued conditions and
activities. For discussion, see Dov Fox, Luck, Genes, and Equality, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 712,
719–21 (2007).
225. Shelton v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 781 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Mo. 1989).
226. Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 723 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29–30 (App. Div. 2001).
227. See, e.g., Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 815 (N.J. 1999); Cauman v. George Wash. Univ.,
630 A.2d 1104, 1109 (D.C. 1993); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814 (N.Y. 1978).
228. See Alice D. Domar et al., The Psychological Impact of Infertility: A Comparison with
Patients with Other Medical Conditions, 14 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 45, 49 tbl. 1
(1993).
229. A comprehensive study of American attitudes about adoption revealed that a thin major-
ity believe “adoptive parents received the same amount of satisfaction from raising an adoptive
child as from raising a biological child.” INTRODUCTION TO FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION
READER 1, 3 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004). Many perceive adoption as
“not quite as good as having one’s own” children. See Allen P. Fisher, Still “Not Quite as Good
as Having Your Own”? Toward A Sociology of Adoption, 29 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 336, 361
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person’s past and future into a single family narrative,” becoming a
step- or adoptive parent cannot satisfy a felt lineage, rooted in flesh
and blood, that “reinforce[s] continuity” with one’s forebear and
“act[s] as a repository of memory for an individual’s past, which may
have been otherwise forgotten.”230 A 2018 New York Times article
profiled childless Americans who cannot “shake the feeling of being
last one to turn the lights out.”231
(2003). In a 2005 survey, a majority of Americans said they took genetics and gestation to “legiti-
mize the child as part of the family” and “construct the child’s identity within” it. Gay Becker et
al., Resemblance Talk: A Challenge for Parents Whose Children Were Conceived with Donor
Gametes in the U.S., 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1300, 1301 (2005). Some even think that adoptive
parents “lack the presumed naturalness that characterizes the love felt by a ‘real’ parent for a
child.” Leslie A. Baxter et al., Narrating Adoption: Resisting Adoption as “Second Best,” 14 J.
FAM. COMM. 253, 255 (2014). Others seek to strengthen the “real” or “natural” connection that
they themselves would feel (or think others perceive) to a future child. Saskia Hendriks et al.,
The Importance of Genetic Parenthood for Infertile Men and Women, 32 HUM. REPROD. 2076,
2087 (2017).
Evidence of a preference for assisted reproduction over adoption comes from research by
Professors Glenn Cohen and Daniel Chen. Cohen and Chen looked at before-and-after rates of
adoption in states that mandated insurance coverage for fertility treatment. See I. Glenn Cohen
& Daniel Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF De-
crease Adoption Rates and Should It Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485 (2010). If adoption was seen
as an equally attractive way to form a family, we would probably expect to see a trade-off with
increased use of IVF as it became less expensive while adoption costs remained the same. The
subsidies did attract more IVF in those jurisdictions, but no fewer adoptions. The researchers
draw the implication that adoption never competed against IVF in the first place. They con-
cluded that “[m]ore empirical work is needed to answer the question” of why those who wanted
to be parents, but could not afford IVF before it was insured, did not consider adoption an
adequate substitute. Id. at 550–54, 575.
230. KAJA FINKLER, EXPERIENCING THE NEW GENETICS: FAMILY AND KINSHIP ON THE MEDI-
CAL FRONTIER 10 (2000). So it is not just the satisfaction some get from making out the similari-
ties they perceive in a child’s appearance or temperament. See Janet L. Dolgin, Biological
Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L. REV. 347, 366–67 (2008) (citing David M.
Schneider, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT (2d ed. 1980)). Or that being pregnant
facilitates an intimate “bond” between woman and fetus that makes procreation “a distinct expe-
rience from adoption.” Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1138 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). Instead, social
norms and expectations surrounding parent-child heredity is usually what matters more to most
people. See June Carbone, Negating the Genetic Tie: Does the Law Encourage Unnecessary
Risks?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 333, 333–34 (2010).
231. Anna Goldfarb, How to Leave a Legacy When You Don’t Have Children, N.Y. TIMES
(July 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/well/how-to-leave-a-legacy-when-you-dont-
have-children.html; see also In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988) (describing the drive
to procreate that consumed the father in the first American surrogacy dispute, the last Holocaust
survivor in his family); Michelle Harrison, Social Construction of Mary Beth Whitehead, 1 GEN-
DER & SOC’Y 300, 302 (1987) (explaining that “maintaining the genetic family line” would enable
that man, William Stern, “to ward off existential loneliness”). Infertility stigma may also help to
explain part of the preference for assisted reproduction over adoption. Guido Pennings, The
Right to Choose Your Donor: A Step Towards Commercialization or a Step Towards Empower-
ing the Patient?, 15 HUM. REPROD. 508, 508–09 (2000). People who pursue IVF or look-a-like
donor services may seek to improve the chances that their family will be able to pass “the child
as-if-begotten, the parent[s] as-if-genealogical.” JUDITH S. MODELL, KINSHIP WITH STRANGERS:
ADOPTION AND INTERPRETATIONS OF KINSHIP IN AMERICAN CULTURE 2 (1994). They may “not
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To assess that loss, courts can and should consider more than what
plaintiffs themselves say about how it has affected them. Life satisfac-
tion surveys are among the aggregative empirical tools that can pro-
vide a subjective sense of how people tend to be impacted by similar
life events and circumstances.232 Another example is the experience
sampling technique that uses mobile devices to survey people’s real-
time reactions to specific experiences throughout the day.233 The self-
reporting that such methods depend on is not perfectly reliable. But
subjective well-being data can still correlate robustly with an array of
demographic facts and experiential circumstances. Professors John
Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur explain:
Using multivariate regression analyses that control for different cir-
cumstances, researchers are able to estimate the strength of the cor-
relations between SWB and factors such as income, divorce,
unemployment, disability, and the death of family members . . . .
[L]ongitudinal data about changes in SWB over time . . . is espe-
cially valuable in assessing the causal effects of life events (such as
marriage, disability, or unemployment) on [subjective well-being],
because the same individual can be surveyed both before and after
want the world—or the child—to know they used a sperm bank to conceive.” Id. For discussion,
see Fox, Racial Classification in Assisted Reproduction, 118 YALE L.J. 1844, 1862 n.87 (2009).
Same-sex couples are not actually so different in this respect. It is true that gays and lesbians do
not face the same expectations to reproduce or pressures to conceal fertility challenges. Ninety
percent of heterosexual men and women report “a strong desire for biological children,” which
compares with forty percent of lesbians and thirty-four percent of gay men. Same-sex couples
are also nearly three times as likely to raise an adopted or foster child. Rachel H. Farr & Char-
lotte J. Patterson, Lesbian and Gay Adoptive Parents and Their Children, in LGBT-PARENT
FAMILIES: INNOVATIONS IN RESEARCH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 39, 45 (Abbie E.
Goldberg & Katherine R. Allen eds., 2013). But same-sex couples still prefer to share DNA with
their children to the extent possible, opting for surrogacy or donor insemination by wide margins
over adoption. GARY J. GATES, DEMOGRAPHICS OF MARRIED AND UNMARRIED SAME-SEX
COUPLES: ANALYSES OF THE 2013 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1 (2015). To one lesbian
couple, the choice was clear: “[W]e could have at least one of us in our children,” or neither. See
KARI´N LESNIK-OBERSTEIN, ON HAVING AN OWN CHILD: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND
THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF CHILDHOOD xii (2008); Dana Berkowitz, Gay Men and Sur-
rogacy, in LGBT-PARENT FAMILIES: INNOVATIONS IN RESEARCH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRAC-
TICE 71, 76 (Abbie E. Goldberg & Katherine R. Allen eds., 2013). Many same-sex couples also
choose a donor or surrogate who looks like the nongenetic parent, in hopes of enriching parent-
child bonds or departing less from traditional norms of family formation. The presence and ap-
pearance of genetic affinity appeals to many same-sex couples too. See LAURA MAMO, QUEER-
ING REPRODUCTION 191–92 (2007); DEAN A. MURPHY, GAY MEN PURSUING PARENTHOOD
THROUGH SURROGACY 152–53 (2015).
232. See ED DIENER, RICHARD LUCAS, ULRICH SCHIMMACK & JOHN HELLIWELL, WELL-BE-
ING FOR PUBLIC POLICY 191 (2009); William Pavot & Ed Diener, Review of the Satisfaction with
Life Scale, 5 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 164, 164 (1993).
233. See Alan B. Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A.
Stone, National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life, in Measuring the Subjective Well-Being
of Nations: National Accounts of Time Use and Well-Being, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. 9, 30
(Alan B. Krueger ed., Univ. Chicago Press 2009), https://www.nber.org/chapters/c5053.pdf.
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the event. This eliminates the need for between-subjects compari-
sons . . . . More importantly, they rely on global judgments about
how people’s lives are going, rather than on those individuals’ mo-
ment-by-moment hedonic experiences [that] are often poorly
remembered . . . because of a person’s momentary mood or the or-
der in which questions are posed, among other errors.234
This non-individualized measure of characteristic damages will of
course overcompensate some people and undercompensate others.
But that would also be true for objective accounts of harm that mea-
sured reproductive losses in terms of deprived capacities to procreate,
for example, as compared with lost capacities to walk or talk or see.235
One advantage the characteristic-harm approach has over an individu-
alized one is that it does not risk giving complainants perverse incen-
tives not to adapt or feel better as a way to drive up their awards.236
To be sure, appeal to life satisfaction surveys will not magically point
to some correct level of compensation for lost chances to reproduce.
But they can reliably approximate losses better than most alternatives.
RANKED HARMS, LOST CHANCES
Attention to facts and context can also help to distinguish greater
reproductive harms from lesser ones. Consider an embryo switch that
prevents plaintiffs from being pregnant as they wanted, but nonethe-
less enables them to be parents. That is not as bad as an otherwise
similar error that also denies them parenthood. Shannon and Paul
Morell’s twin daughters were two and a half years old when the
couple decided they wanted to give them a little brother or sister. Af-
ter using IVF to conceive their twins, the couple had six embryos left
in storage. But when they returned to the fertility clinic in hopes of
having another child, the embryos were nowhere to be found. “I real-
234. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis v.
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1621–22 (2013) (citing series empirical studies that
provide data on the hedonic consequences of various life events, and demonstrate ways to mone-
tize them); see also David E. DePianto, Tort Damages and the (Misunderstood) Money-Happi-
ness Connection, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1385 (2012); Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger,
Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745 (2007); Christo-
pher Essert, Tort Law and Happiness, 36 QUEENS L.J. 1 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory
Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157 (2008); Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the
New Science of Happiness, 85 IND. L.J. 553 (2010); Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain
and Suffering Awards: They Shouldn’t Be (Just) About Pain and Suffering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD.
S195 (2008); Sean H. Williams, Self-Altering Injury: The Hidden Harms of Hedonic Adaptation,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 535 (2011).
235. See AMARTYA K. SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 39–41 (1992).
236. This point comes from Jonathan Masur.
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ized I was powerless,” Shannon said.237 The clinic had transferred
them into another patient, Carolyn Savage. Carolyn and her husband
Sean were devout Catholics who had been trying to have a baby them-
selves. They decided not to abort or sue for custody after Mrs. Savage
gave birth to the boy they called “Little Man.” The Savages ultimately
turned the baby over to the Morells. Shannon was overjoyed to have
her genetic child to raise. But still she noted: “All the emotions a
woman has during pregnancy to bond with her child I haven’t had. I
never felt the baby kick—none of that.”238 Meanwhile, Carolyn’s act
of kindness left her with post-traumatic stress disorder. “That absent
child is always with you, a loss you feel some days as yearning and
other days in a gasp of pain.”239
Here is another example: Permanent deprivations will tend to cause
more acute harms than temporary reproductive setbacks. Psychology
studies on the impact of infertility suggest that the inability to have a
first child tends to cause greater heartache than missing out on an
additional one.240 It is not so different when professional negligence is
to blame. In another context—disputes between former spouses about
whether to use their frozen embryos—courts have already gauged the
relative strength of reproductive interests based on whether the par-
ties already have offspring or might yet be able to. In a 2012 Penn-
sylvania case, the ex-wife sought access to implant their cryopreserved
embryos over the man’s objection.241 The couple had not reached any
prior agreement about what should happen to the embryos in the
event of divorce. The court balanced their reproductive interests, con-
cluding that hers—in favor of procreation—were more compelling
under the circumstances. The woman’s age (forty-four), health (cancer
survivor), and marital status (single) meant that the embryos were
“likely her only chance at genetic parenthood and her most reasona-
ble chance for parenthood at all,” given that adoption agencies prefer
married couples.242
237. PAUL MORELL & SHANNON MORELL, MISCONCEPTION: ONE COUPLE’S JOURNEY FROM
EMBRYO MIX-UP TO MIRACLE BABY 65 (2010).
238. Mike Celizic, Genetic Parents of Embryo Felt “Powerless,” TODAY (Sept. 23, 2009, 6:00
AM), https://www.today.com/health/genetic-parents-embryo-felt-powerless-1C9404873.
239. CAROLYN SAVAGE & SEAN SAVAGE, INCONCEIVABLE: A MEDICAL MISTAKE, THE BABY
WE COULDN’T KEEP, AND OUR CHOICE TO DELIVER THE ULTIMATE GIFT 1 (2011); Woman in
Embryo Mix-up Gives Birth to Boy, CNN (Sept. 26, 2009, 1:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/
HEALTH/09/25/wrong.embryo.birth/.
240. See Arthur L. Greil et al., Variation in Distress Among Women with Infertility Evidence
from a Population-Based Sample, 26 HUMAN REPROD. 2101, 2112 (2011).
241. See Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. 2012).
242. Id. at 1138–40.
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In a similar case out of Connecticut from 2017, the one-time hus-
band and wife again had not entered into any contract over how to
dispose of the IVF embryo they had created.243 This time, the woman
who wanted the embryos destroyed while the man wanted them im-
planted in a surrogate.244 The court awarded the woman control over
the embryos in deference to the “life-long emotional and psychologi-
cal repercussions” of having genetic parenthood foisted upon her.245
The court reasoned that the man’s existing biological children and po-
tential to reproduce made his interest in the embryos weaker by com-
parison.246 He “is already a father and is able to become a father to
additional children, whether through natural procreation or further in
vitro fertilization.”247 Losing out on an additional child plausibly
harms victims less than denials of the opportunity to be a parent in the
first place, or at all.
This is not to say that being deprived of procreation can still devas-
tate people who have children already, or might still in the future.
Hewing compensation levels too closely to family size undervalues the
significance of parenthood for any child beyond the first. And it risks
sanctioning injuries that disproportionately affect African Americans
and Hispanics, who are twice as likely as Caucasians or Asians to have
four-plus children.248 Courts also err when they deny damage awards
for a negligently caused miscarriage, just because the couple con-
ceived again, or are young and healthy enough that they still could.249
A Louisiana judge explained that later-born offspring cannot “take
the place” of the stillborn child or diminish the enormity of that
loss.250
Besides the severity of any particular instance of deprived procrea-
tion, there is also the extent to which professional misconduct is to
blame for having caused that reproductive loss. For most fertility pa-
tients, procreation is far from a sure thing. Disease, accidents, cancer
treatment, prenatal history, and passing years leave one in eight
American couples today unable to conceive or gestate without the
243. See Bilbao v. Goodwin, 2017 WL 5642280 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2017).
244. Id.
245. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717 (N.J. 2001).
246. Bilbao, 2017 WL 5642280, at *4.
247. J.B., 783 A.2d at 717.
248. See FAMILY SIZE, BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, PEW RES. CTR. (May 7, 2015), http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/05/07/childlessness-falls-family-size-grows-among-highly-edu-
cated-women/st_2015-05-07_childlessness-12/.
249. See Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1290 (N.J. 1993); Kammer v. Hurley, 765 So. 2d 975,
978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
250. McCann v. ABC Ins. Co., 640 So.2d 865, 875 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
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help of reproductive technology.251 Those who struggle with fertility
have modest opportunities to get pregnant and carry a child to term
even in the absence of professional misconduct. So the severity of
harm that is attributable to negligence in these cases will depend in
part on the plaintiff’s pre-injury opportunities of gestation or live
birth, in the event that their treatment had gone just right.252
Reproductive prospects vary from couple to couple and person to
person. Age and sex are the most salient factors. Male and female
fertility diminish at different rates. Women’s biological clocks tick
faster. Their fixed number of eggs grow more fragile over time, in-
creasing the risk of miscarriages or genetic anomalies for women who
hold off on procreation until they are older, whether to focus on ca-
reer, find a partner, or any other number of reasons.253 In 2016, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported that, for the first
time, American women ages thirty to thirty-four gave birth at higher
rates than women in their late twenties.254 The take-home-baby rate
for female fertility patients under thirty-three hovers around thirty to
forty percent.255 At thirty-five or so, many “women confront a ‘fertil-
ity cliff,’ when the chances of becoming pregnant decline sharply as
the[ir] eggs decrease in number and quality.”256 The average forty-
year-old woman has a five percent chance of getting pregnant. By
forty-five, her chances drop to one in one hundred.257 A lost embryo
or pregnancy might be that woman’s last chance to conceive. Men typ-
ically have more time.
Male fertility does not decline as dramatically with age. Men replen-
ish sperm throughout their lives, enabling biological offspring until
later. Billy Joel, George Lucas, Steve Martin, and Robert De Niro all
251. See CDC, 2012 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS
RATES REPORT 23 (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2012-report/art-2012-fertility-clinic-
report.pdf.
252. See William J. Stewart & Randi Lynn Scheinblum, Deprivation of Parenthood—A New
Tort?, 6 WEST. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 244–45 (1979).
253. See Heather Murphy, Held in Reserve: Too Few Mr. Rights Lead More Women to Freeze
Their Eggs, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2018, at D2.
254. See CDC, Natality Dashboard, Age Specific Birth Rates, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/prod-
ucts/vsrr/natality-dashboard.htm# (last updated Jan. 30, 2018).
255. See Siladitya Bhattacharya et al., Factors Associated with Failed Treatment: An Analysis
of 121,744 Women Embarking on Their First IVF Cycles, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 12 (2013), http://jour
nals.plos.org/plosone/article/asset?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0082249.PDF.
256. Ariana Eunjung Cha, She Championed the Idea That Freezing Your Eggs Would Free
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had kids in their sixties. But that larger window will not make much
difference to straight couples committed to conceiving with half of the
genetic material from each partner, or else not at all. But a man’s
longer time horizon might temper the loss of deprived procreation for
different-sex couples who are open to using donor eggs. Contrast the
destruction of a cancer patient’s only pre-chemo sperm—after which
no biological child will be possible—with the loss of embryos that can
still be replaced, or the unsuccessful surrogate pregnancy that can be
tried again with another gestational carrier.258
But for many victims of procreation deprived, taking a baby home
was not a safe bet. It might be for some couples in the late stages of a
healthy pregnancy. But in the first three months of pregnancy, one in
four women miscarry.259 Here is how one federal judge, writing in
concurrence, spelled out a few of the factors that might help a trial
court “to determine the extent of damages” that should awarded to
parents “for the wrongful death of a stillborn” child:
1. the stage of pregnancy at which the stillbirth occurs; 2. the medi-
cal history of the mother with respect to previous childbirths; 3. the
number of children the couple presently has; 4. whether the mother
used artificial means to induce pregnancy, i.e., fertility drugs; 5. the
probability of pregnancy going to full term; 6. any prior history of
miscarriage; 7. prenatal care of the stillborn child; 8. parental prepa-
ration for the forthcoming child, i.e., house additions, baby crib and
any other indicia of the degree of expectation exuded by the
parents.260
The chances of live birth are lower still if an embryo had yet to be
implanted, as in the fertility clinic freezer failures. Because most cases
of frozen embryo loss involve people who were already struggling
with infertility, their chances of reproducing were iffy even before
negligence rendered their materials unusable.
Badly behaving specialists should not be liable for the infertility
that patients already suffered from, or other reproductive complica-
tions they would have anyway, no matter what quality medical care
they received. Probabilistic recovery offers a principled way to com-
pute damages for the wrongful destruction of gametes or embryos
under these circumstances.261 Suppose a couple’s age and health gave
them a thirty percent chance of live birth if the clinic had not dropped
258. See Dara Purvis, Expectant Fathers, Abortion, and Embryos, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 330,
337–38 (2015).
259. See Roy G. Farquharson, Eric Jauniaux & Niek Exalto, Updated and Revised Nomencla-
ture for Description of Early Pregnancy Events, 20 HUM. REPROD. 3008, 3008 (2005).
260. Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019, 1030–31 & n.15 (La. App. 1980), aff’d, 402 So. 2d
633 (La. App. 1981).
261. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
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the tray containing their embryos; the error reduced that probability
to three percent. Courts should start by coming up with some dollar
figure that roughly captures the denial of all-but-guaranteed procrea-
tion. To calculate awards for the actual (lower) odds of pregnancy and
parenthood they had before the embryo loss, reduce that initial figure
by the thirty percent chance that competent care would have given
them to reproduce with their frozen embryos intact. Finally, take
ninety percent of that discounted amount. This is because the negli-
gence still left them one-tenth of that chance they would have had
either to conceive on their own or possibly to create another embryo
with which to initiate a successful pregnancy. Say a jury valued the
assurance of parenthood at $100,000. Thirty percent of that absolute
loss would be $30,000, and nine-tenths of that amounts to a final rem-
edy of $27,000. That award would just be for the reproductive injury
of procreation deprived. It would not replace but add to whatever sep-
arate compensation may be due for out-of-pocket costs related to the
failed procedure, the price of replacing it, or any associated medical or
work expenses.
Plaintiffs in a case like this would need to show that the lost chance
was not insignificant—that competent treatment would have given
them a reasonable chance to reproduce. For some people—women
over forty-four, or men of any age who have no working sperm
count—their potential for biological children was already so low that
even the most egregious mistake would not make procreation much
less likely than it was before.262 In the case of cancer survivor Carolyn
Witt discussed earlier,263 the court noted that she and her husband
would “not be entitled to recover” if her lost ovarian tissue had given
them “no chance of success” anyway, at least assuming this should
have been “known and understood by the plaintiffs.”264 This is the
conclusion that a Louisiana court reached in a 2011 case of shoddy
obstetric treatment. Zsa Zsa Dunjee was a thirty-six-year-old diabetic
woman with fibroid problems. Board-certified experts agreed that her
doctor “deviated below the standard of care” by failing to postpone
her fertility treatment until her diabetes was under control and her
fallopian tubes were no longer infected.265 But the court found “no
record facts to support the conjecture that . . . Ms. Dunjee would have
262. See Ian Sample, Chances of IVF Success “Futile” for Women over 44, Says Study,
GUARDIAN (June 16, 2015, 7:46 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jun/17/women-
ivf-birth-donor-eggs.
263. See supra notes 204–208 and accompanying text.
264. Witt v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 977 A.2d 779, 787–88 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008).
265. In re Dunjee, 57 So. 3d 541, 544 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
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been able to conceive” in her health at that age, even if her doctor had
not forged ahead and provided otherwise high-quality care.266 Since
Dunjee “had no real chance of becoming pregnant” anyway, the court
did not hold the negligent doctor liable for that negligible and “specu-
lative loss.”267 That is not to say that her doctor should not have low-
ered Dunjee’s expectations by advising her that procreation was next
to impossible.
Fertility clinics have long fed unrealistic patient expectations about
reproductive outcomes. The former director of a leading clinic re-
cently divulged that many IVF programs “massag[e] the data” to feign
“extraordinarily high rates of pregnancy even in women over 40.”268
Public outrage over inflated fertility clinic success rates brought fed-
eral and state regulation in the early 1990s. But it was not enforced.
And by 1996, an American Medical Association report found that
“deceptive advertising and insufficient informed consent” were ram-
pant in assisted reproduction.269  The report said that misrepresenting
the likelihood of success violates moral obligations of informed con-
sent—before proceeding with any procedure, a doctor must obtain the
patient’s go-ahead after disclosing the relevant side effects and alter-
natives.270 False promises of IVF success often omit pertinent facts
about proposed care. But it is hard for patients to prove they would
have refused treatment if they had been made aware of those facts.271
And reproductive specialists are given a pass on informed consent by
offering patients a cursory overview of forms to read rather than any-
thing like a meaningful exchange.272
Some fertility patients get creative in their quest for legal relief after
being misled. After seven failed IVF cycles, Jayne Karlin of New York
sued her clinic under the state’s laws against deceptive business prac-
tices and false advertising for misrepresenting success rates and health
risks. She won, but only after an investigative report by the TV pro-
gram 20/20 exposed the wildly exaggerated claims splashed across the
266. Id. at 552.
267. Id. at 551–52.
268. Jane E. Brody, I.V.F.’s Misleading Promise to Those over 40, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/well/the-misleading-promise-of-ivf-for-women-over-40.html.
269. AM. MED. ASS’N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS & COUNCIL ON SCI. AF-
FAIRS, ISSUES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 2 (1996). For
discussion, see Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: A Growing Need for Con-
sumer-Oriented Regulation of the In Vitro Fertilization Industry, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 265, 299–313
(1997).
270. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
271. Id.
272. Jody Lynee´ Madeira et al., Inform and Consent: More Than Just “Sign Here,” 108 FER-
TILITY & STERILITY 40, 41 (2007).
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clinic’s promotional materials, broadcast advertisements, and seminar
talks.273 Any deterrence under consumer protection claims is trifling,
given the difficulty of showing that misrepresentation caused larger
harms. The regulatory penalty is usually a small fine,274 while claims
for breach of informed consent require proof of bodily injury from
hidden side effects or foregone alternatives.275 That is why courts re-
ject such suits where the harm from “undisclosed risks” relates “to the
condition of pregnancy itself,” as opposed to “the patient’s physical
integrity.”276
CONCLUSION
Freezer failures and other high-tech injuries raise hard questions
about whether and how courts should treat the wrongful deprivation
of valued goods that people did not have quite yet. Courts deny re-
course when misconduct shatters people’s dreams of having biological
children. Victims often cannot point to any physical or financial injury;
they were not parents already; and getting offspring was never as-
sured. Our legal system seems resigned that these tragedies are just
part of modern life, beyond the power of law to do anything about.
But those reproductive harms are neither trivial nor unduly specula-
tive. Today’s plaintiffs missed the heyday of private law expansion. It
has been more than century since courts last flexed their common-law
muscles to establish new torts like slander, privacy, and defamation.
But the scale and frequency of embryo mix-ups and fertility failures
make recovering that muscle memory inescapable. The time has come
to remedy future intangible losses for genetic affinity and the chance
to reproduce.
273. See Karlin v. IVF America Inc., 712 N.E.2d 662, 664–65, 666–67 (N.Y. 1999).
274. See, e.g., Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, § 5, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
275. See Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 557, 570 (2009).
276. Karlsons v. Guerinot, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 939 (App. Div. 1977). For discussion, see Aaron
D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of
Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 656–57 (1988); Marjorie M. Shultz, From In-
formed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 233–36 (1985).
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